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OMISSION SUSPICION: JURIES, HEARSAY,
AND ATTORNEYS’ STRATEGIC CHOICES
JUSTIN SEVIER*
ABSTRACT
Attorneys understand that presenting evidence consists of a series of strategic choices.
Yet legal scholars have not studied whether jurors are sensitive to the trial strategy that
underlies those choices. Do jurors question why an attorney has omitted what jurors
consider the “best” evidence of some trial fact and has instead put forth weaker evidence? Do
they attempt to understand the motivation behind that choice, and does that affect their
legal judgments?
Six original experiments explore these questions in the context of hearsay evidence. The
experiments reveal a ubiquitous finding: Jurors carefully scrutinize a party’s strategy for
presenting hearsay, and this has a substantial impact on their verdicts. Moreover, jurors
scrutinize an attorney’s strategic decision to proffer hearsay regardless of the identity of the
legal actor, regardless of the type of case, and regardless of the type of hearsay presented.
These findings demonstrate that when evaluating hearsay evidence, jurors are attuned
to factors that the law may not appreciate. This has substantial implications for legal policy
and practice. These findings suggest a new dimension of competency with respect to how
jurors evaluate evidence. They also suggest that the normative debate over hearsay
evidence—that jurors do not think critically about it—should change. Finally, the findings
present a cautionary tale to trial practitioners who make ground-level decisions about
hearsay evidence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The production of weak evidence when strong is available can lead
only to the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse. Silence then becomes evidence of the most convincing character.
– Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States1
The American legal system allows attorneys substantial freedom
to present their cases in the manner they deem most persuasive and
effective. The practicing attorney has several tools in her arsenal:
She may vary the type of evidence she presents, the mode through
which that evidence is presented, or even the types of witnesses she
calls. She may present either direct evidence, such as an eyewitness,
or circumstantial evidence, such as the results from forensic analysis.
She may choose to call live witnesses to testify, or she may opt to enter into evidence writings or recordings. She may also call a mixture
of witnesses, including those who will testify only to their knowledge
of the facts of the case and others who will proffer expert testimony.
These strategic decisions are not without potential costs. For
many reasons, a party may decide to proffer weaker evidence instead
of evidence a factfinder may consider the “best” evidence of some trial
fact. For example, an attorney who is concerned that an eyewitness is
unlikely to be persuasive may, under certain circumstances, produce
1. 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) (citation omitted).
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documentary evidence instead.2 By doing so, the attorney can convey
the same information to the factfinder without submitting the
eyewitness to potentially damaging cross-examination. But if the
factfinder would expect the witness to testify, might the attorney’s
failure to call the witness—even though the decision to do so is permitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence—affect the factfinder’s
judgment of the persuasiveness of the attorney’s case? Might a jury
look beyond the evidence presented to it and attempt to discern an
attorney’s motivation for producing—or failing to produce—certain
witnesses? If so, does a jury’s ability to “see through” an attorney’s
trial strategy affect its verdicts in systematic ways?
Consider domestic violence trials. Commentators have noted that
prosecuting these cases can be difficult because an initially cooperative witness—typically the allegedly battered spouse—may later become uncooperative and refuse to testify against the alleged batterer.3 The prosecuting attorney is then put in a quandary: should she
instead proffer the alleged victim’s 911 telephone call, or should she
dismiss the charges against the defendant? Legal commentators have
expressed concern that the prosecutor’s failure to produce the alleged
victim in court may seriously impede the prosecutor’s ability to convict
the defendant.4 These concerns may be fueled, in part, by the motivational inferences commentators believe that jurors will make regarding the victim’s failure to testify. This suggests that the motivation
underlying a party’s trial strategy might be an important, largely
unstudied variable in determining how jurors reach legal decisions.
Motivation is a driving force behind human behavior, from our
desire to eat, to our desire for safety, to our desire to love and to
achieve.5 It can be either intrinsic or extrinsic,6 and the result of either conscious desires or subconscious preferences.7 It can even shape
the ways in which we perceive the world around us and the ways in
which we make decisions. For example, the psychological literature
2. See generally FED. R. EVID. art. VIII, X (allowing certain records to be admitted
into evidence as an exception to the general rule against hearsay and prescribing specific
rules for the admissibility of writings, recordings, and photographs). Practitioners should
consult their specific state’s law on this issue as well.
3. See, e.g., Neal A. Hudders, The Problem of Using Hearsay in Domestic Violence
Cases: Is a New Exception the Answer?, 49 DUKE L.J. 1041, 1041-42, 1044 (2000); Robert P.
Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 415 (2005).
4. Hudders, supra note 3, at 1047, 1051.
5. See A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370, 394
(1943); see also Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the
Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 68, 68 (2000) (stating that self-motivation is based on “people’s inherent growth
tendencies and innate psychological needs”).
6. See Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 105 (1971).
7. See Maslow, supra note 5, at 386-88.
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on motivated reasoning has demonstrated that people are sometimes
so motivated to achieve some outcome, or so motivated to preserve
some aspect of their world view, that instead of searching rationally
for information that either confirms or disconfirms a particular
belief, they seek out solely information that confirms what they
already believe.8
Recent empirical findings reveal a dark side to our perceptions of
others’ motives. In Western cultures, psychologists have identified a
“norm of self-interest,” in which people believe that “self-interest both
is and ought to be a powerful determinant of behavior.”9 People therefore tend to act (or appear to act) in their self-interest because it is
normatively expected that they do so, and they tend to believe that
opinions or actions that do not have clear self-interest motivations
“will be regarded as unnatural and deviant” by others.10 Recent empirical data supports this proposition. People tend to imagine selfinterested motives for others’ generosity and altruistic behavior,11
and people whose self-interested motives are not obvious are viewed
suspiciously12 and penalized socially.13 In sum, people tend to be cynical of the motives for others’ actions.
People also make motivational inferences regarding the inactions—or omissions—of others. Recent research suggests that, because communicators are motivated by strategic self-presentation,
they often will underreport negative information in describing their
perceptions of others.14 For example, when describing a job applicant
to a colleague, the communicator might describe the candidate’s demeanor (by mentioning that the candidate is “nice”) and omit information relevant to the applicant’s competency for the job. Importantly, listeners are attuned to communicators’ self-presentation motivation and will infer—by the colleague’s silence—that the candidate is
8. See Erica Dawson, Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, Motivated Reasoning and
Performance on the Wason Selection Task, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1379,
1379-80 (2002); Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480,
482-83 (1990). This is sometimes referred to as the confirmation bias. See, e.g., P.C. Wason,
On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 129 (1960); see also Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175-78 (1998).
9. Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1053, 1053 (1999).
10. Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest 9 (CEPR Conference on Psychol. & Econ.
June 8, 2011), available at http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/3/3509/papers/miller.
11. See Clayton R. Critcher & David Dunning, No Good Deed Goes Unquestioned:
Cynical Reconstruals Maintain Belief in the Power of Self-Interest, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1207 (2011).
12. Rebecca K. Ratner & Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest and Its Effects on
Social Action, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 14-15 (2001).
13. Nadia Chernyak & David Pizarro, The Case for “Too Much” Altruism: Perceptions
of and Reactions Towards Altruistic Behaviors (2012) (unpublished manuscript in preparation) (on file with author).
14. Hilary B. Bergsieker et al., Stereotyping by Omission: Eliminate the Negative,
Accentuate the Positive, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1214, 1214 (2012).
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not qualified for the job.15 Thus, people appear quite skilled at recognizing the motivations of others and drawing appropriate inferences
from those motivations.
In light of this psychological research, it is no surprise that motivation may manifest itself implicitly in numerous aspects of the law.
A legal actor’s motivation and credibility are entangled in various
ways and inform jurors’ legal judgments, including their judgments
of a defendant’s truthfulness16 and the persuasiveness of expert testimony.17 Moreover, it is possible that the impact of motivation on a
party’s credibility may extend to a party’s trial strategy itself.
Additional empirical tests of (1) our armchair theories about the
role of motivation in the law and (2) how jurors respond to attorneys’
trial strategies are necessary. Specifically, how jurors perceive a party’s motive to proffer weaker evidence at trial is an empirically unstudied topic. An illustrative area that has escaped empirical attention in this regard is a party’s decision to proffer hearsay evidence in
court. To the extent that hearsay is weaker evidence—inasmuch as
the original speaker cannot be cross-examined in court—do jurors
care about why they receive it?
It is not obvious that jurors would take into account a party’s motivation when evaluating the probative value of hearsay, or that policymakers expect jurors to do so. Nonetheless, the experiments reported in this Article suggest that jurors do exactly that. Moreover,
they do so regardless of the legal actor who proffers the hearsay, regardless of the type of case in which the hearsay is presented, and
regardless of the type of hearsay proffered. These results are the first
to suggest that a party’s motivation—actual or perceived—for proffering weaker evidence like hearsay plays a crucial role in jurors’ determinations of the credibility of that evidence.
Several implications follow from the findings reported in this Article. The findings suggest that jurors sometimes look beyond the evidence when evaluating its probative weight. They also suggest to policymakers that one of the rationales for the ban on hearsay evi15. See Adam Harris et al., “Damned by Faint Praise”: A Bayesian Account, 31 PROC.
ANN. CONF. COGNITIVE SCI. SOC’Y 292 (2009) (examining innuendo effects in social
interaction); Nicolas Kervyn et al., The Innuendo Effect: Hearing the Positive But Inferring
the Negative, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 77 (2012); Juan M. Madera et al.,
Gender and Letters of Recommendation for Academia: Agentic and Communal Differences,
94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1591 (2009) (examining the application of innuendo effects in
professional settings).
16. See Clyde Hendrick & David R. Shaffer, Effect of Pleading the Fifth Amendment on
Perceptions of Guilt and Morality, 6 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 449, 449-52 (1975). For a more
robust discussion of this experimental study, see infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
17. See Joel Cooper & Isaac M. Neuhaus, The “Hired Gun” Effect: Assessing the Effect
of Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of Expert Testimony, 24
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (2000). For a more detailed description of this experimental
study, see infra note 87-89 and accompanying text.

6

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

dence—that jurors fail to critically evaluate it—may not be accurate.
The results also provide critical new information regarding how advocates can best present their cases to triers of fact. Attorneys ignore—at considerable cost—the inferences that flow from their strategic choices to present evidence.
II. LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
Courts routinely state that they assume jurors evaluate only the
evidence presented to them and follow legal instructions issued by
the trial judge.18 Behavioral research, however, suggests that these
assumptions are often wrong.19 Jurors are subject to a slew of cognitive biases and are not always attuned to information that legal policymakers expect.20 This occurs with respect to many aspects of trials,
including determinations of liability or guilt,21 punitive damages
awards,22 and capital sentencing.23

18. See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1987); see also State v. Walker, 356 S.E.2d 344, 346 (N.C. 1987) (“The law assumes that jurors will follow their instructions and act in a rational fashion.”); Stephen E. Fienberg & Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV. 771, 775 n.20 (1986) (“[T]he law assumes that a factfinder
should be rational.”).
19. See, e.g., CHRISTINE L. RUVA, HOW PRETRIAL PUBLICITY AFFECTS JURORS DECISION MAKING AND MEMORY (2010) (explaining how pretrial publicity affects views of the
evidence); Harold Sigall & Nancy Ostrove, Beautiful but Dangerous: Effects of Offender
Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime on Juridic Judgment, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 410 (1975) (explaining that characteristics of the defendant herself, like physical
attractiveness, affect jurors’ verdicts and sentencing decisions); see also J. Kevin Barge,
David W. Schlueter & Alex Pritchard, The Effects of Nonverbal Communication and Gender on Impression Formation in Opening Statements, 54 S. COMM. J. 330, 331-32 (1989)
(explaining that an attorney’s nonverbal cues, including pauses and stuttering, affect jurors’ views of the evidence against his client); Bonnie Erickson et al., Speech Style and
Impression Formation in a Court Setting: The Effects of “Powerful” and “Powerless” Speech,
14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 266 (1978) (explaining that speech style of defendant’s
attorney affects views of evidence against the defendant).
20. See CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 211 (2002)
(stating that some jury decisions reflect “systematic biases, some due to fundamental properties of the human mind, others due to culturally based, learned habits” and that “there
are aspects of human behavior that seem to be erratic and unpredictable in terms of commonsense intuitions and behavioral science principles”); see also Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The
Implications of Psychological Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit
Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 MO. L. REV. 83, 99-107 (2008) (discussing
cognitive and unconscious biases that affect a decisionmaker’s judgment before even making a decision); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995) (arguing that people’s unconscious forms of bias undermine the assumptions reflected in Title VII’s disparate treatment jurisprudence).
21. See Ronald C. Dillehay & Marla R. Sandys, Life Under Wainwright v. Witt: Juror
Dispositions and Death Qualification, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 160 (1996) (finding that
28.2% of “death qualified” jurors are so biased against defendants that they would vote
automatically to sentence a guilty defendant to death, in violation of the law); D. Lynn
Hazelwood & John C. Brigham, The Effects of Juror Anonymity on Jury Verdicts, 22 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 695, 710 (1998) (finding that anonymous jurors are subject to the psychologi-
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These research findings have implications for a variety of areas
under the law. For example, the law of evidence is premised largely
on codified but empirically untested folk wisdom regarding how legal
actors, like jurors, behave.24 Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which governs the use of hearsay evidence in federal trials, is
an apropos example of this phenomenon, given its armchair assessments of when hearsay actors are likely to be truthful and when they
are not.25 Surprisingly, researchers only recently have examined how
jurors process hearsay evidence, and the research so far is limited.
Hearsay is an intriguing area to study empirically, because the
decision to proffer hearsay is strategic, inasmuch as it often arises
under circumstances where a hearsay declarant has died, has moved
away, or has become uncooperative. Yet policymakers apparently assume that jurors do not consider this “extralegal” information when
assigning probative weight to hearsay evidence. The studies reported
in this Article suggest that, with respect to hearsay evidence, jurors
do not behave as policymakers believe they do. Instead, jurors’ perceptions of the probative value of hearsay include an evaluation of a
party’s motive for proffering the hearsay evidence. Moreover, they
discount the hearsay evidence in the absence of a benign explanation
for receiving it.
To situate the experiments reported in this Article in their proper
context, I will briefly discuss (1) the law of hearsay and recent psychological research regarding how jurors process hearsay evidence and
(2) what courts and psychologists have said regarding the propriety
and ability of jurors to make motivational inferences more generally.

cal concept of deindividuation and may be more prone to convict a defendant when the
evidence against him is strong).
22. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20; Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004) (finding that juries differ
from judges in awarding punitive damages).
23. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by
Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224, 232 (1996) (arguing that jurors misunderstand capital sentencing instructions and, as a result, “tend to fall back on
their own prior knowledge”); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1169 (1995) (suggesting that
“juror beliefs and expectations about the legal system may lead them to erroneous interpretations about legally relevant concepts” contained in capital sentencing instructions).
24. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the
Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges, 83 B.U. L. REV. 315, 317 (2003) (stating that the fundamental justification for recognizing evidentiary privileges is the “behavioral assumption
. . . that the typical layperson . . . would neither consult with nor divulge to a confidant . . .
but for the assurance of confidentiality furnished by a formal evidentiary privilege). For a
more robust discussion of this proposition, see infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
25. See FED R. EVID. 803; Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the Modern
American Criminal Trial: An Adversary-Oriented Approach, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 485-87,
499 (1998).
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A. Hearsay at 35,000 Feet
1.

The Hearsay Doctrine

The rule forbidding hearsay evidence at trial has been called the
“spoiled child” of the common law evidence rules.26 It has no doubt
earned this reputation because of the scholarly attention paid to its
myriad intricacies and its slew of complex exceptions. Although parties to litigation have used hearsay evidence in legal proceedings for
almost 500 years,27 empirical scholarship on the effects that hearsay
evidence has on trial outcomes is both recent and sparse. This is
particularly odd because a prominent justification for the hearsay
bar—that jurors are incompetent to properly evaluate hearsay evidence—is an empirically testable question.
The rule against hearsay is, at its core, a rule against using second-hand information in court. Hearsay is formally defined as an
out-of-court statement (made by a declarant) used in court (through,
for example, the testimony of a hearsay witness) to prove that the
substance of the out-of-court statement is true.28
Hearsay often contains relevant information that a jury may find
useful in making legal judgments. Nonetheless, courts generally purport to bar hearsay evidence.29 Policymakers and legal commentators
have offered an array of explanations for the bar against hearsay.
Initially, legal scholars objected to hearsay because the hearsay declarant is not subject to an oath to tell the truth, as compared to a
witness who testifies in court.30 Other commentators have expressed
concern that hearsay “removes us” from the facts of the case31 and, in
26. JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS’ TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 238 (1935);
see also Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical
Enquiry Concerning the Prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 65, 65 (1991).
27. See Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26 at 67.
28. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“ ‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”). For example, if I testify in
court to a belief that aliens are real and I say, “My neighbor told me that she saw a spaceship land on her driveway,” the statement is inadmissible hearsay, because I am recounting the out-of-court story in an effort to demonstrate that aliens exist. However, if I testify
to my neighbor’s out-of-court statement in an effort to demonstrate that my neighbor is
mentally ill, the statement is not hearsay and is potentially admissible, because I am not
recounting the conversation to demonstrate that aliens exist. This is but one example of
the intricacies and nuances that surround the hearsay doctrine.
29. See FED. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or
by Act of Congress.”).
30. See GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (Garland Publ’g, Inc. 1979) (1754);
Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26, at 68-69.
31. See Mortimer R. Kadish & Michael Davis, Defending the Hearsay Rule, 8 LAW &
PHIL. 333, 348-49 (1989) (“Taking the direct testimony of those who have seen or heard a
disputed fact places the trier of fact as close to that fact as the nature of adjudication al-
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criminal trials, deprives the defendant of his right under the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause to confront witnesses.32 These
issues, in turn, may lead to a “trial by ambush.”33
Other scholars have worried about the effects of hearsay on the
legal system itself. Some commentators have argued that reliance on
hearsay evidence can discredit the public’s perception of courts as
impartial adjudicators of disputes.34 Other commentators have argued that judges would have too much discretion in deciding which
hearsay statements they would allow into evidence.35 Professor
Charles Nesson opined that trial outcomes might lack finality because hearsay declarants may later dispute the accuracy of hearsay
statements attributed to them during trial.36
Perhaps the most enduring rationale for barring hearsay evidence
is the theory that jurors are incompetent to evaluate its probative
strengths and weaknesses. This rationale harkens back to 19th century English courts where Lord Mansfield expressed concern that “no
man can tell what effect [hearsay] might have upon [lay jurors’]
minds.”37 These courts worried that, because the hearsay declarant
cannot be cross-examined, jurors will fail to appreciate the potential
untrustworthiness of the evidence.38
To be sure, hearsay evidence is rife with potential untrustworthiness. The trustworthiness of hearsay depends on several factors at
two different levels: that of the declarant and that of the hearsay
lows. Hearsay, on the other hand, puts the trier of fact at least one remove in a role resembling that of a court of appeals.”).
32. The Supreme Court has recently breathed new life into the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause in a series of cases examining the hearsay doctrine. In these decisions, the Court has ruled that a criminal defendant has an absolute constitutional right
under the Sixth Amendment to cross-examine her accuser if the accuser makes an out-ofcourt, testimonial statement against the defendant. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 68-69 (2004). Although the Confrontation Clause is not directly relevant to the nontestimonial hearsay at issue in this Article, Part VI, infra, contains a discussion of the
Confrontation Clause.
33. William C. Thompson & Maithilee K. Pathak, Empirical Study of Hearsay Rules:
Bridging the Gap Between Psychology and Law, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 456, 460 (1999).
34. See Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 495, 495 (1987)
(“Reliance on . . . hearsay declarants threatens important values related to the rationality
and fairness of trial adjudication.”).
35. See, e.g., Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response
to Professor Nesson, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1986).
36. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1373 (1985).
37. William Fitzharding Berkeley, (1811) 171 Eng. Rep. 128 (H.L.) [135] (appeal taken
from Eng.); see Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26, at 66.
38. Regina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence and Hearsay: The Influence of “Secondhand”
Information on Jurors’ Decisions, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 345, 346 (1995). These English
jurists might have had in mind the infamous and oft-cited trials of Nicholas Throckmorton
and Sir Walter Raleigh, which consisted largely of untrustworthy hearsay evidence. See
Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26, at 67-68. Although a jury spared Throckmorton, a jury
convicted Raleigh. He was eventually executed. Id.
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witness. The declarant must have accurately perceived the event at
issue, accurately understood it, accurately remembered its details,
and accurately conveyed those details to the hearsay witness. The
hearsay witness, in turn, must have accurately perceived the declarant’s statement, accurately remembered it, and must accurately convey it to the factfinder. Any mistake during this process—through
misinterpretation, forgetfulness, bias, or deception—reduces the
trustworthiness of the hearsay statement.39
Given the dangers surrounding the reliability of hearsay statements, one might expect that courts have banned hearsay evidence in
its entirety. But, in fact, they have not. For practical reasons, courts
and policymakers have excluded from the hearsay bar certain kinds
of statements—including admissions by party opponents and certain
prior statements made by trial witnesses—that nonetheless meet the
conceptual definition of hearsay.40 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Evidence contain twenty-eight explicit exceptions to the rule barring
hearsay, ranging from statements made while an individual is dying,
to statements blurted out because of the excitement of some event, to
statements made while seeking medical treatment.41 Many of these
exceptions were created, at least in part, because policymakers believe these types of statements are highly reliable.42 For example, according to policymakers, a dying individual would not want to meet
his maker with a lie on his lips, an excited individual would not have
time to fabricate her statement, and people are disincentivized to lie
to their doctors when seeking treatment for medical ailments.43 Interestingly, these rationales rely on largely untested empirical
hunches about how people behave.

39. See Thompson & Pathak, supra note 33, at 464. See also Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974) (discussing these mistakes); Edmund M.
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV.
177 (1948) (same).
40. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
41. See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807.
42. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (stating, while providing no
empirical evidence in support, that “[t]he present rule proceeds upon the theory that under
appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial
even though he may be available”).
43. Id. (explaining the rationale for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
doctrine as “simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication,” and allowing an exception to the hearsay bar for statements made during the treatment of medical ailments “in view of the patient’s strong motivation to be truthful”); see
also FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note (justifying the rationale for the dying
declaration exception to the hearsay bar on the basis that, “[w]hile the original religious
justification for the exception may have lost its conviction for some persons over the years,
it can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological pressures are present” for a dying
individual to make truthful statements).
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This patchwork of behavioral intuition has led psychologists to
question the assumptions underlying the hearsay doctrine and its
exceptions. These psychologists posited that human beings confront
hearsay frequently in their daily lives, are able to distinguish highquality hearsay from poor-quality hearsay, and can discount poorquality hearsay accordingly.44 In other words, these psychologists argued that jurors are sensitive to factors that can affect the reliability
of hearsay statements.
2.

Empirical Hearsay Scholarship

The empirical study of hearsay began in the early 1990s. The
scope of the research is limited, but the research has yielded broad
lessons about how jurors process hearsay evidence.
The initial experiments examined how jurors process hearsay
generally. Do jurors give hearsay its appropriate weight or do they
under- or over-value it? Landsman and Rakos conducted the first
such experiment, in which they varied the strength of various hearsay statements in a mock trial.45 They found that, even though mock
jurors reported that stronger hearsay statements were more important pieces of evidence than were weaker hearsay statements,
none of those statements ultimately affected jurors’ guilt judgments.46
Meine, Park, and Borgida reported similar results the next year
when they compared the effects of hearsay evidence with the effects
of eyewitness evidence on juror verdicts.47 Although the presence of
an eyewitness nearly doubled the conviction rate (compared to circumstantial evidence alone), hearsay evidence raised the conviction
rate just 4%.48 Moreover, participants self-reported that they did not
consider the hearsay at all, which suggests that jurors may actually
undervalue hearsay evidence.49
44. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.
45. Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26, at 73-74. Researchers manipulated the
strength of the statements by varying the degree of the hearsay witness’s confidence and
the degree to which the declarant was able to observe the crime. Id.
46. Id. at 76.
47. See Peter Meine, Roger C. Park & Eugene Borgida, Juror Decision Making and
the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683 (1992).
48. Id. at 691-92, 699. This 4% difference was not statistically significant.
49. Id. at 695. Jurors’ preference for evidence directly from the declarant also has
been found in studies examining so-called “child hearsay.” In those studies, mock jurors
were more likely to convict a defendant when the child testified directly, as compared to
hearsay given by the child’s mother. See David F. Ross, R.C.L. Lindsay & Dorothy F. Marsil, The Impact of Hearsay Testimony on Conviction Rates in Trials of Child Sexual Abuse:
Toward Balancing the Rights of Defendants and Child Witnesses, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 439, 446-47 (1999). They also rated the child’s testimony as more candid and honest
when it came directly from the child in court. Id. at 447-48; see also Jonathan M. Golding,
Mary C. Alexander & Terri L. Stewart, The Effect of Hearsay Witness Age in a Child Sexual
Assault Trial, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 420, 427 (1999) (reporting a marginally significant difference (p = .09) in convictions when the child testified directly compared to testi-
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A third experiment studied whether jurors are sensitive to the differences in the probative value of various hearsay statements and
eyewitness identifications.50 Jurors were not sensitive to differences
in the probative value of eyewitness identifications, but they were
sensitive to differences in the probative value of hearsay statements.51 Altogether, these initial experiments suggest that jurors are
not passive, unquestioning perceivers of hearsay.
These experiments leave an important question unanswered:
What factors, in particular, do jurors focus on when they evaluate
hearsay evidence? A handful of additional studies provide some answers to this question, but also complicate the empirical narrative
substantially. For example, some researchers found that jurors are
attuned to factors such as the suggestive questioning of child declarants52 and the effects of age on memory for hearsay statements in elder abuse cases.53
But follow-up experiments have revealed that jurors are blind to
other factors that affect the accuracy of hearsay. For example, Golding, Alexander, and Stewart found that, in the context of “child hearsay,” jurors are not always attuned to the potential effects of the
hearsay witness’s age on the reliability of hearsay statements.54 Other researchers have demonstrated that although hearsay witnesses
often recall the “gist” of the declarant’s statement, they often fail to
mony from a hearsay witness); Gail S. Goodman et al., Hearsay Versus Children’s Testimony: Effects of Truthful and Deceptive Statements on Jurors’ Decisions, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 363, 389 (2006) (finding that “exposure to live child testimony was significantly associated with jurors’ perception of greater child credibility and empathy toward the child”
and “indirectly influenced jurors’ confidence of defendant guilt”); Allison D. Redlich et al., A
Comparison of Two Forms of Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 7 CHILD MALTREATMENT 312, 324 (2002) (finding that, before deliberation, “jurors who were presented with [a
child declarant’s videotaped testimony] were more likely to believe the child disclosed fully
during the pretrial forensic interview, which in turn increased child believability ratings
and then consequently also increased ratings of defendant guilt.”).
50. Margaret Bull Kovera, Roger C. Park & Steven D. Penrod, Jurors’ Perceptions of
Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 707, 719 (1992). The researchers
put graduate students in the position of eyewitnesses to a potential crime and then required them to recall what they had seen after either a short or lengthy delay. This created
objectively “good” and “poor” eyewitnesses. The researchers, in turn, had these eyewitnesses report to hearsay witnesses what they had observed. The hearsay witnesses then recalled what they heard after either a short or lengthy delay. This created objectively “good”
and “poor” hearsay witnesses. Mock jurors then observed these eyewitnesses and hearsay
witnesses and rated how persuasive they were. Id. at 707-10.
51. See id. at 719-20.
52. See Maithilee K. Pathak & William C. Thompson, From Child to Witness to Jury:
Effects of Suggestion on the Transmission and Evaluation of Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 372, 374, 377, 378 (1999).
53. See Emily E. Dunlap et al., Perceptions of Elder Physical Abuse in the Courtroom:
The Influence of Hearsay Witness Testimony, 19 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 19, 35-36 (2007).
54. See Golding et al., supra note 49 at 433-34. But see John E. B. Myers et al., Jurors’
Perceptions of Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 388, 41112 (1999); Amye R. Warren et al., The Believability of Children and Their Interviewers’
Hearsay Testimony: When Less is More, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 846, 852 (2002).

2012]

OMISSION SUSPICION

13

recall the specifics (or they recall them inaccurately),55 and the resulting information loss can prevent jurors from making accurate decisions about the quality of the hearsay statements.56
Additional hearsay research adds to the complexity. In examining
how jurors respond to judicial instructions regarding hearsay, one
study found that jurors are capable of completely disregarding inadmissible hearsay that has been “blurted out” in court,57 but another
study suggests that under certain conditions, jurors cannot disregard
this evidence.58 Moreover, jurors appear incapable of using hearsay
for a limited purpose, for example, to determine a witness’s state of
mind or an expert witness’s credibility,59 and strong judicial instructions to disregard hearsay can produce psychological reactance in jurors—a backlash effect in which jurors defiantly and explicitly consider the forbidden evidence.60
In sum, there exists a small collection of diverse empirical findings
that examines how triers of fact respond to hearsay evidence. The
initial empirical narrative was straightforward: Because jurors have
experience with hearsay in their everyday lives, they are skeptical
and discerning when evaluating it in court. Further research on the
specific variables on which jurors focus, however, significantly complicates this narrative and suggests that how jurors perceive hearsay
may be more context dependent than initially believed. Moreover,
jurors’ evaluations of hearsay can interact with judicial instructions
in surprising ways.
Although these studies provide significant insight into how jurors
perceive hearsay, they raise as many questions as they answer. In

55. See Amye R. Warren & Cara E. Woodall, The Reliability of Hearsay Testimony:
How Well Do Interviewers Recall Their Interviews With Children?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 355, 369 (1999). This finding could have a dramatic impact on the admissibility of
hearsay statements. For example, an interviewer might believe that, during the interview,
a child spontaneously implicated her parent as an abuser—which can cause a court to admit the incriminating statement into evidence under the excited utterance exception—
when the interviewer herself may have suggestively elicited the “spontaneous” statement
from the child. See David Dunning, On the Social Psychology of Hearsay Evidence, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 473, 477 (1999).
56. See Julie A. Buck, Amye R. Warren & John C. Brigham, When Does Quality
Count?: Perceptions of Hearsay Testimony About Child Sexual Abuse Interviews, 28 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 599, 619 (2004); Warren & Woodall, supra note 55, at 357.
57. See Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal
Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 407, 422 (1995).
58. See Dae H. Lee, Daniel A. Krauss & Joel Lieberman, The Effects of Judicial Admonitions on Hearsay Evidence, 28 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 589 (2005).
59. See Angela Paglia & Regina A. Schuller, Jurors’ Use of Hearsay Evidence: The
Effects of Type and Timing of Instructions, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 514 (1998); Schuller,
supra note 38, at 349.
60. See Lee et al., supra note 58, at 590-91. There is currently no explanation in the
literature that has harmonized these findings.
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the late 1990s, several commentators called for further research,61
provided a framework for that future research,62 and identified specific areas into which current hearsay research could be extended.63 Despite a few trickles of additional research,64 empirical research on
hearsay has largely receded.
B. Motivational Inferences and the Law
Until now, the vast majority of empirical hearsay research has
focused, in whole or in part, on whether jurors are attuned to cognitive factors that may influence the reliability of the hearsay statement itself. These factors include the effects of time and age on a person’s memory for a hearsay statement, and the ways in which suggestive questioning can alter a child declarant’s schema and memory
for an event. But what if jurors are attuned to other factors that
might affect the quality of a hearsay statement but are not obviously
linked to the properties of the hearsay itself? Past research has not
addressed this question, and the answer may shed additional light on
whether jurors are thinking critically about hearsay evidence specifically, and attorneys’ strategic decisions more generally.
An unexplored research area, first proposed by Dunning, is the
role that a party’s motivation might play in jurors’ perceptions of
hearsay evidence.65 Within the confines of evidentiary rules, practice
rules, statutes, and state and federal constitutions, parties to litigation are free to present their case to a factfinder in any manner they
choose. Parties therefore often have a choice regarding whether to
proffer hearsay evidence, instead of the declarant’s in-court testimony, to a factfinder. No one has studied whether jurors are attuned to
the motivation underlying a party’s strategic decision to proffer hearsay and what effect, if any, that decision might have on how jurors
respond to hearsay evidence. For example, imagine a scenario in
which an attorney wishes to shield a hearsay declarant from crossexamination by instead calling a hearsay witness to the stand at trial. To the extent that jurors accurately deduce what the attorney has
done, might jurors infer that there is some impeachable aspect of the
underlying declarant’s testimony and discount the hearsay? Conversely, if an attorney proffers hearsay out of necessity—for example,
because the declarant has died—will jurors take that into account

61. See Lucy S. McGough, Hearing and Believing Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 485, 494 (1999).
62. See Thompson & Pathak, supra note 33, at 465.
63. See Dunning, supra note 55, at 477-79.
64. See, e.g., Buck et al., supra note 56; Dunlap et al., supra note 53; Goodman et al.,
supra note 49; Lee et al., supra note 58.
65. Dunning, supra note 55, at 481.
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when evaluating the evidence and reduce the discount they might
normally give the probative weight of the hearsay evidence?
There are many reasons to believe that jurors might be attuned to
a party’s motivation to proffer hearsay. As Dunning notes, it is a
shibboleth of social psychology that when evaluating the persuasive
force of an actor’s argument, people are quite sensitive to factors, like
bias, that might render the argument less credible and persuasive.66
Consider, for example, inadmissible facts that come to light through
pretrial publicity, on which jurors often rely, even though they should
not.67 If mock jurors are provided information that casts suspicion on
the pretrial publicity—for example, that the person who introduced
the pretrial publicity has a proverbial axe to grind—jurors discount
the publicity when rendering their judgments.68
To some degree, the law appears to recognize that jurors will focus
on a trial actor’s motivation when making legal decisions. Consider,
for example, the “absent witness” instruction available in many jurisdictions. The instruction states that where a party, without explanation, fails to call a witness who is (1) known to the party, (2) friendly to the party (or at least not hostile), and (3) available to give
material, favorable, non-cumulative testimony, then the jury may
infer that the witness would have given testimony unfavorable to
that party.69 Thus, under certain circumstances, the law explicitly
allows—and even encourages—jurors to consider when they make
their legal judgments the motivation underlying a party’s decision
not to call a witness.
Similarly, the law appears to recognize that sometimes jurors will
focus inappropriately on a trial actor’s motivation and will instruct
jurors to disregard any such inferences. For example, if a certain par-

66. See id. at 481.
67. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Kramer, Norbert L. Kerr & John S. Carroll, Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409 (1990).
68. See Dunning, supra note 55, at 481; Steven Fein, Allison L. McCloskey & Thomas
M. Tomlinson, Can the Jury Disregard That Information? The Use of Suspicion to Reduce
the Prejudicial Effects of Pretrial Publicity and Inadmissible Testimony, 23 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1215, 1220 (1997).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Harwood, 189 F. App’x 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Drozdowski, 313 F.3d 819, 825 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Nahoom, 791
F.2d 841, 846 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Anders, 602 F.2d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Haliburton v. State,
561 So. 2d. 248, 250 (Fla. 1990); Commonwealth v. Schatvet, 499 N.E.2d 1208, 1210-11
(Mass. 1986); People v. Gonzalez, 502 N.E.2d 583, 585-86 (N.Y. 1986). A typical absent
witness instruction reads as follows: “If it is peculiarly within the power of [Party A] to
produce a witness who could give material testimony, or if the witness would be favorably
disposed to the government, failure to call that witness may justify an inference that [his
or her] testimony would be unfavorable to [Party A]. No such inference is justified if the
witness is equally available or favorably disposed to both parties or if the testimony would merely repeat other evidence.” See, e.g., FIRST CIRCUIT CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.12
(2003), available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/resources/pattern2003/html/patt6qer.htm.
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ty should not naturally be expected to call a witness, and both parties
have an equal opportunity to call that witness, the judge may instruct the jury that the witness’s absence “should not affect [their]
judgment[s] in any way.”70 Underlying this jury instruction is a presumption that the jury may unfairly believe that one of the parties
has purposely “hidden” the witness and may unfairly penalize that
party when making their legal judgments. In theory, an equal opportunity instruction can neutralize these suspicions.
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have explicitly held
that factfinders may consider a party’s strategy for proffering evidence in deciding the probative weight to afford that evidence. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, the federal government sought
an injunction against the defendant film distributors to prevent them
from carrying out an alleged conspiracy to fix prices for movie licenses in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.71 The defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court the district court’s finding that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy. In affirming the
district court’s decision, the Supreme Court noted that the district
court’s decision was based, in part, on the fact that the defendants
omitted “as witnesses any of the [senior officers of their companies]
who [had] negotiated the contracts” (and “would have had knowledge
of the existence or non-existence of [any collusion] among the distributors”).72 Instead, the defendants called as witnesses middle managers who had little knowledge of the transactions at issue.73 In affirming the district court, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he failure under the circumstances to call as witnesses those [senior] officers . . . is
itself persuasive that their testimony, if given, would have been unfavorable” to the defendants.74 Moreover, “[t]he production of weak
evidence when strong is available can lead only to the conclusion that
the strong would have been adverse. Silence then becomes evidence
of the most convincing character.”75
70. See 4 LEONARD SAND, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL ¶ 75.01 (2007);
see also United States v. Caccia, 122 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Lewis,
40 F.3d 1325, 1336 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Spinosa, 982 F.2d 620, 632 (1st Cir.
1992); Brown v. United States, 414 F.2d 1165, 1166-68 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Fleming v. SafeCo
Ins. Co. of America, 206 Cal. Rptr. 313, 319 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Jackson v. State, 575
So. 2d 181, 187-88 (Fla. 1991); Commonwealth v. Bryer, 494 N.E.2d 1335, 1337-38 (Mass. 1986).
71. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 213 (1939).
72. Id. at 221.
73. Id. at 226.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citation omitted). Other courts have followed suit. See e.g., UAW v. NLRB, 459
F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The failure to bring before the tribunal some circumstance, document, or witness, when either the party himself or his opponent claims that
the facts would thereby be elucidated, serves to indicate, as the most natural inference,
that the party fears to do so, and this fear is some evidence that the circumstance or document or witness, if brought, would have exposed facts unfavorable to the party.”); see also
United States v. Roberson, 233 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1956) (“Unquestionably the failure

2012]

OMISSION SUSPICION

17

Some federal courts have gone further. In United States v. Christians, for example, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a trial court ruling
that allowed prosecutors to proffer evidence to clarify the reason that
the government had not produced certain evidence in its case-inchief.76 The federal government had accused Christians of being a
felon in possession of a firearm.77 The government had intended to
use, as the centerpiece of its case, the defendant’s videotaped confession, which the government had allowed the unsupervised defendant
to view.78 Just before trial, the government discovered that the videotapes had been erased and sought to put forth evidence that the defendant had erased the tapes.79 The defendant objected to the evidence as more prejudicial than probative, but the district court ruled
the evidence admissible. In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the
Eighth Circuit noted that “the evidence was necessary to clarify the
reason for the government’s failure to present the videotapes to the
jury,” and that “the government itself was in danger of being unfairly
prejudiced if it was not permitted to introduce the testimony about
the videotapes being blank.”80 Without this evidence, held the court,
“there was a substantial risk that the prosecution’s failure to produce
the videotapes at trial would give rise to a jury inference that the
government had something to hide.”81
These cases raise the same question: Why might jurors be attuned
to a party’s motivation when they make legal judgments? Psychology
research indicates that the answer may lie in the ways in which jurors arrive at their verdicts. Initially, many researchers believed that
jurors reach legal decisions in a Bayesian way: each juror “calculates”
a prior probability of the defendant’s guilt and, with each piece of
new evidence, “recalculates” the probability of the defendant’s guilt
continually throughout the trial.82 But in the late 1980s, Reid Hastie

of a defendant in a civil case to testify or offer other evidence within his ability to produce
and which would explain or rebut a case made by the other side, may, in a proper case, be
considered as a circumstance against him and may raise a presumption that the evidence
would not be favorable to his position.”).
76. 200 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (8th Cir. 1999).
77. Id. at 1125.
78. Id. at 1126-27.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1127.
81. Id. However, not all courts take this view. In a criminal trial involving forensic
evidence, the government proffered testimony explaining that it would not be unusual to
fail to find the defendant’s latent fingerprints on a handgun at issue. Characterizing the
relevancy of the evidence as “obscure” in dicta, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, noted that “[s]ince no fingerprints were found, neither side was helped; and we can’t
see what difference it makes whether failure to find fingerprints on a gun is common or
uncommon.” United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2005).
82. For a discussion of this model and variations on it, see Kenworthey Bilz, We Don’t
Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature and the Narrative Model of Judging, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 429 (2010).
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and Nancy Pennington proposed a vastly different theory of legal decisionmaking: jurors create alternative “trial narratives” and choose
the narrative that best fits all of the evidence.83 Hastie and Pennington termed this model, which has received considerable empirical
support,84 the “story model” of jury decisionmaking.85 Perhaps it is
unsurprising that in crafting these narratives, jurors are likely to
look at the motivation of different trial actors when determining
which trial narrative is the “correct” one in a given case.
We see evidence of jurors’ attentiveness to motivational factors in
myriad legal contexts. For example, prosecutors routinely decide to
include in their case-in-chief a motive on the part of the criminal defendant for committing the crime. Interestingly, prosecutors do so
even though most trials do not require the prosecutor to provide a
motive. Of course, prosecutors will provide a motive often to demonstrate that a defendant possessed the specific intent to commit the
crime. But researchers recognize that underlying these prosecutorial
decisions is an understanding that jurors, in creating a trial narrative, will inevitably make inferences about the defendant’s motivation to commit the crime, and may question why the prosecutor has
not established such a motive.86
We see further evidence of jurors’ attention to a trial actor’s motivation with respect to expert witnesses. Cooper and Neuhaus found
what they termed a “hired gun effect” among experts who are highly
paid for their testimony.87 The researchers found that jurors rated
experts who charged significantly higher hourly rates for their testimony as less trustworthy and more annoying than experts who
charged lower hourly rates for the same substantive testimony.88 This
suggests that jurors make spontaneous negative inferences regarding
the motivation of these experts to testify, and the study further
suggests that these inferences affect not only jurors’ impressions of

83. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story
Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992).
84. See, e.g., Reid Hastie, What’s the Story? Explanations and Narratives in Civil Jury
Decisions, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
23, 25-29 (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008).
85. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 83, at 189-92.
86. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 64-65 (1981); see also Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and Punishment, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
669, 700 (2000) (stating that research on story models “tell[s] us that jurors typically begin
[their analysis of the case] with the subjective motives and intentions of the actor . . . to find
the motivational thread that weaves plot and story,” and “if we examine how prosecuting and
defense attorneys tell their stories in opening and closing statements, we would probably
find the subjective thread woven quite prominently throughout those stories as well.”).
87. Cooper & Neuhaus, supra note 17, at 158, 162.
88. Id. at 158 (reporting a main effect of an expert’s fee on these traits).
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the experts, but also their judgments of the persuasive force of the
experts’ testimony.89
Jurors also make these inferences with respect to defendants who
exercise their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during trial. Although jurors are instructed that they cannot draw negative inferences from a defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment, an experiment by Hendrick and Shaffer suggested that jurors
do so.90 Mock jurors who read a trial transcript in which the defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment right were more likely to think the
defendant committed the crime and rated the defendant as significantly less moral than a defendant who testified and denied his involvement in the crime.91 The authors suggested, among other phenomena, that when the defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment, jurors believed that the defendant was withholding information from
them.92 Jurors then reacted to that withholding of information by imputing onto the defendant a motivation for doing so: that he was
guilty and was “hiding” behind the Fifth Amendment.93
Other studies provide support for the view that when jurors think
that evidence has been withheld from them, they draw a negative
inference regarding the withholding party’s motivation for doing so.
In a mock criminal trial, Shaffer, Sadowski and Hendrick manipulated the obviousness with which the defendant was withholding from
mock jurors information about a crime.94 Defendants who more obviously withheld information were deemed more likely to be guilty, less
attractive, and less desirable than defendants who had not obviously
withheld information.95
In a follow-up study, Shaffer and Sadowski varied whether a defendant’s decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment was attributable to
the defendant alone or instead to an external source, such as the defendant’s attorney.96 Again, the defendant’s decision to invoke the
Fifth Amendment led jurors to draw negative inferences against the
defendant.97 Interestingly, the guilt ratings for defendants who in89. The expert’s fee did not affect mock jurors’ verdicts by itself. The researchers observed a statistically significant interaction between the expert’s fee and the expert’s credentials, such that highly paid, highly credentialed experts were much less likely to affect
jurors’ verdicts than were other experts. Id. at 155. In sum, “[w]hat apparently affected the
jury was a combination of pay and credentials.” Id. at 154.
90. Hendrick & Shaffer, supra note 16, at 451.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 452.
93. Id. at 451.
94. See David R. Shaffer, Cyril Sadowski & Clyde Hendrick, Effects of Withheld
Evidence on Juridic Decisions, 42 PSYCHOL. REP. 1235, 1236-38 (1978).
95. See id. at 1240.
96. See David R. Shaffer & Cyril Sadowski, Effects of Withheld Evidence on Juridic
Decisions II: Locus of Withholding Strategy, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 40,
41 (1979).
97. Id. at 42-43.
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voked the Fifth Amendment of their own accord were marginally
greater than the ratings for those who did so on the advice of their
attorney.98 These findings suggest that (1) jurors draw negative inferences when a defendant withholds information from them; and (2) if a
defendant’s decision to withhold information is clearly attributable to
an external source, jurors may adjust their inferences accordingly.
C. The Present Study
What are the implications of these research findings for how jurors think about a party’s motivation to introduce hearsay evidence?
To the extent a party decides to proffer hearsay, the party often omits
the declarant’s in-court testimony. Past research suggests not only
that jurors pay attention to the motivations underlying the actions of
prosecutors, defendants, and expert witnesses, but also that these
actors’ motivations become more salient to jurors in the absence of
stronger evidence. Thus, with respect to a party’s decision to proffer
hearsay evidence in lieu of a declarant’s in-court testimony, I hypothesized the following:
(1) Jurors will discount hearsay evidence compared to the
declarant’s in-court testimony.
(2) When weighing hearsay evidence, jurors will consider
the party’s strategy for proffering it.
(3) In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for receiving
hearsay evidence, jurors will draw negative inferences
from the hearsay, which will affect their legal judgments.
(4) These effects will be magnified when the hearsay put
forth is a particularly poor substitute for the declarant’s
in-court testimony.
The current study addresses these hypotheses.
III. MAIN EXPERIMENT: METHOD
A. Participants
One hundred twenty jury-eligible volunteers99 from the community surrounding a large Midwestern university participated in this
study. Participants were recruited through several methods: (1)
emailed announcements to participate in a study on jury decisionmaking; (2) in-person solicitation in cafeterias and train stations
surrounding campus; and (3) in-class announcements in various de98. Id. at 42.
99. M-age = 26.09, SD = 9.65. The age of participants ranged from eighteen to fifty
years. Sixty-seven percent of the participants identified themselves as Caucasian, fifteen
percent identified themselves as Asian, twelve percent identified themselves as AfricanAmerican, and six percent identified with other races and ethnicities.
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partments around the university. Participants did not receive payment or, if they were students, course credit. Rather, all participants
were entered into a raffle to receive an iPod Shuffle device.
Participants were randomly assigned to seven experimental conditions and assumed the role of a mock juror in a criminal trial. After
signing informed consent forms, these volunteers read a hypothetical
trial vignette and responded to a series of questions. Participants
were then debriefed and thanked.
B. Procedure
Participants read a brief vignette of a criminal trial in state court.
The state accused the defendant of robbing a convenience store,
shooting the clerk, and absconding with $300 in cash from the register. The trial presented conflicting evidence regarding the defendant’s guilt and contained evidence presented through a hearsay witness. Two variables were systematically manipulated: (1) the prosecutor’s motivation for putting forth the hearsay evidence; and (2) how
well the hearsay evidence substituted for the declarant’s in-court testimony (the “substitution quality” of the evidence). In a control condition, mock jurors heard the declarant’s in-court testimony instead of
hearsay evidence.
In each condition, mock jurors learned that a man who claimed to
have witnessed the robbery dialed 911 and gave the name and description of the man he claimed robbed the store.100 Officers arrested
the suspect one block away with $400 in his coat pocket. In all experimental conditions, the trial included testimony from the arresting
officer, the defendant, and the 911 operator, who provided hearsay
testimony on behalf of the alleged eyewitness declarant.
Depending on the experimental condition, mock jurors either (1)
learned that the prosecutor was proffering hearsay out of necessity
because the alleged eyewitness had died before trial (the “benign”
strategy); or (2) learned that the prosecutor was proffering hearsay
out of convenience because the prosecutor wished to shield the 911
caller from cross-examination (the “suspicious” strategy).101 In the

100. The factual scenario was designed to fit the “excited utterance” and “present sense
impression” exceptions to the rule barring hearsay, and was designed so that the hearsay
statements did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.
Specifically, the 911 caller characterized the situation as an ongoing emergency with a
gunman who was still at large. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1147-49 (2011);
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
101. In an additional control condition, some participants received no explanation for
the prosecutor’s use of hearsay. In this “no explanation” (or “unknown”) control condition,
the vignette read only that “[t]he State’s case-in-chief was presented by the 911 operator.”
To determine whether jurors prefer in-court testimony to hearsay evidence, the data collected from these participants were compared to the data from the other control condition,
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benign condition, the vignette read: “The State’s case-in-chief was
presented by the 911 operator. The State did not call the 911 caller to
the stand because he had died of an unrelated illness before trial.” In
contrast, in the suspicious condition, the vignette read: “The State’s
case-in-chief was presented by the 911 operator. The State could have
had the 911 caller testify but chose not to because the State was not
sure he would be an effective witness on cross-examination.”102
Additionally, the substitution quality of the 911 operator’s testimony was manipulated: either (1) she played an audiotape of her
conversation with the alleged eyewitness (the “good” substitution,
because it provided an accurate account of what the alleged eyewitness had said); or (2) she testified as to the gist of that conversation
(the “poor” substitution). For participants who received a good substitution, the vignette read, “On the tape, the caller said that the robber
was John Smith from the neighborhood—Caucasian, about 6’2”, approximately 220 pounds, with a birthmark on his face.” For participants who received a poor substitution, the vignette read: “According
to the 911 operator, the caller named the defendant, whom he had
apparently seen around the neighborhood; said he was White, a little
over 6’ tall and around 220 pounds; and that he had some sort of
mark on his face.” In both conditions, the 911 operator testified as to
how long ago the call took place, how often she works, and how many
calls she fields on average per shift.
The testimony of the arresting officer and the defendant did not
vary by condition. This produced a 2x2 between-subjects design
with two additional control conditions (which contained either an
in-court, non-hearsay witness, or a hearsay witness who was called
for unspecified reasons).103
After reading the vignette, participants answered several questions relating to their impressions of the trial. Participants first rated, on a 7-point Likert scale,104 the likelihood that the defendant had

in which an in-court witness recounted the details of of the crime. The results are discussed in Part IV.C., infra,
102. Mock jurors were informed of the party’s motivation through a “God’s eye” view. It
was important to first establish whether jurors consider information regarding a party’s
trial strategy at all. Once that phenomenon is established, then more subtle manipulations
of the party’s motive are appropriate. A subtler manipulation of a party’s strategy to proffer hearsay was undertaken in Follow-up Study 1. See infra Part V.A.1.
103. A 2x2 design means that one experimental variable—here, the prosecutor’s trial
strategy—contains two different versions (benign and suspicious,) while the other—the
substitution quality of the evidence—also contains two different versions (good and poor). A
between-subjects design means that different participants read different versions of the
trial vignette.
104. A Likert scale is a psychometric scale commonly used in questionnaires to capture
data from ordinal variables (from 1 to 7). See ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 172 (2010). Likert scales are used
frequently to collect data from mock jurors, although scholars have noted the limitations of
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committed the robbery (1 = not at all likely and 7 = very likely). Participants then rated their confidence in that decision and answered
questions about the persuasiveness and strength of the prosecution’s
and defense’s cases. Participants then answered questions regarding
the persuasiveness, strength, trustworthiness, influence, and morality of each witness, the defendant, and the prosecutor.
Finally, participants answered free-response questions, which
asked them to recall the events that occurred at trial, discuss specific
pieces of evidence, and list any information they would have found
helpful when evaluating the case. Participants then answered standard demographic questions.
IV. MAIN EXPERIMENT: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Overview
The results supported the hypotheses.105 Mock jurors were attuned
to the prosecutor’s motivation to put forth hearsay evidence and drew
negative inferences regarding the prosecutor’s motivation when there
was not a satisfactory explanation for the prosecutor’s use of hearsay.
This was particularly true when the hearsay was a poor substitute
for the direct evidence. The analysis of these results will proceed in
four parts: the results of the manipulation checks, participants’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt, their judgments about the strength
of the prosecution’s case, and their judgments about individual pieces
of evidence and trial actors.

this method. See, e.g., Gerald Albaum, The Likert Scale Revisited: An Alternate Version, 39
J. MARKET RES. SOC’Y 331, 341 (1997).
105. Data were analyzed using (1) a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), which
provides a statistical test of whether the means of several groups are equal, and (2) unpaired t-tests for detecting differences in sample means. ANOVA results are represented
by an F-statistic, t-tests are represented by a t-statistic, and the sizes of the effects are
represented by K2p. Means are denoted by the letter “M” and standard deviations are denoted by the letters “SD.” See generally LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 104 at 55-335 (explaining empirical research methodologies and statistical techniques).
Differences are denoted as “statistically significant” in this Article if the statistical
tests indicate that the likelihood that the difference observed would occur by chance is 5%
or less (as indicated by the p-value as p < 0.05). A difference is “marginally significant” if
the likelihood of seeing such a difference by chance is greater than 5% but less than 10%.
See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination,
102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 485 n.117 (citing BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed. 1989)). Planned t-test comparisons were accompanied by Tukey-Kramer analyses to stabilize the “familywise error rate” and avoid false
positives. See, e.g., James Jaccard, Michael A. Becker, & Gregory Wood, Pairwise Multiple
Comparison Procedures: A Review, 96 PSYCHOL. BULL. 589 (1984) (discussing several techniques, including the Tukey technique, for controlling Type I error when making multiple
comparisons among groups).
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B. Manipulation Checks
After completing the questionnaires, and depending on the experimental condition, participants rated how well either the 911 operator’s testimony or the 911 tape substituted for the testimony of the
alleged eyewitness. The 911 tape106 was rated a significantly better
substitute for the alleged eyewitness’s testimony than was the 911
operator’s testimony.107
Twenty pre-test participants, who did not otherwise participate in
this study, rated the “suspiciousness” of the prosecutor’s decision to
put forth hearsay evidence. The decision to proffer hearsay evidence
because the hearsay declarant had died108 was rated significantly less
suspicious than was the decision to proffer hearsay to deprive the
defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant.109
Additionally, the free-response questions asked participants to
provide a detailed account of their memory for the facts of the case.
All participants correctly recalled the prosecutor’s motive for putting
forth hearsay evidence if a motive had been provided to them.
Thus, the manipulation checks confirmed that the substitution
quality of the evidence differed appropriately, the strategies for proffering hearsay differed with respect to their suspiciousness, and the
participants understood the prosecutor’s motive for putting forth the
evidence if a motive was provided to them.
C. Perceptions of Guilt
Preliminary analyses examined whether jurors prefer an eyewitness’s in-court testimony to hearsay evidence. As seen in Figure 1,
when the prosecutor proffered testimony directly from an eyewitness
(instead of through hearsay evidence), mock jurors perceived the defendant as more likely to be guilty110 and they perceived the prosecutor’s case as stronger.111 Thus, in accordance with past research, jurors found a declarant’s in-court testimony more persuasive than
hearsay evidence.
106. M = 5.01, SD = 1.04.
107. M = 3.23, SD = 1.18, F(1, 118) = 75.44, p < .001.
108. M = 5.22, SD = 0.83.
109. M = 2.89, SD = 1.05, F(1, 16) = 27.14, p < .001.
110. F(1,52) = 17.09, p < .001, K2p = .25. M-in-court = 5.22, SD-in-court = 0.81; M-nomotive-hearsay = 4.03, SD-no-motive-hearsay = 1.08 (see left-hand side of Figure 1). The
data from the two “no motive” conditions (whose means were not significantly different
from each other) were collapsed and averaged into one omnibus “no motive” hearsay condition that was compared to the in-court testimony condition. To simplify the analysis going
forward, this “no motive” condition has been eliminated from most of the remaining analyses, which will focus on the differences between participants who were exposed to benign
hearsay and those who were exposed to suspicious hearsay.
111. F(1, 52) = 22.26, p < .001, K2p = .30. M-in-court = 5.11, SD-in-court = 0.83; M-nomotive-hearsay = 3.50, SD-no-motive-hearsay = 1.32 (see right-hand side of Figure 1).
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Figure 1
Juror Perceptions of In-Court Testimony and Hearsay
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The next set of analyses examined the extent to which the prosecutor’s motivation for proffering hearsay evidence affected jurors’
perceptions of the defendant’s guilt. A 2 (motivation: benign vs. suspect) x 2 (hearsay substitute: good vs. poor) analysis of variance
(ANOVA)112 on participants’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt revealed a main effect of the prosecutor’s motivation:113 jurors were
more likely to perceive the defendant as guilty when the prosecutor’s
motive for proffering hearsay was benign114 than when his motive
was suspicious.115 The analysis also revealed a marginally significant
effect of hearsay substitute,116 such that jurors were more likely to
perceive the defendant as guilty when the hearsay evidence was a
good substitute117 than when it was poor.118

112. ANOVA assumes that the dependent measures are continuous variables. A Likert
scale is technically an ordinal variable (participants cannot explicitly rate the defendant’s
likelihood of guilt as 6.5; they must choose either 6 or 7). Thus, some may argue that an
ordered probit regression, which does not assume that the dependent measures are continuous, would be the most technically accurate analysis. Decades of psychological experiments, however, have treated the Likert scale as a continuous variable appropriate for an
ANOVA, on the theory that points 1 through 7 are simply markers along a continuous
scale. See, e.g., Margaret E. Bell, Attitudes Toward Changing Economic Roles for Women, 6
J. INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOL. 38 (1979) (analyzing Likert scale data using ANOVA); John D.
Murray, Jo Ann Spadafore & William D. McIntosh, Belief in a Just World and Social Perception: Evidence for Automatic Activation, 145 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 35, 38-42 (2005) (same).
113. F(1, 68) = 77.37, p < .001, K2p = .53.
114. M = 5.19, SD = 0.98.
115. M = 3.21, SD = 1.08.
116. F(1, 68) = 2.37, p = .09, K2p = .03.
117. M = 4.38, SD = 1.15.
118. M = 4.03, SD = 1.67.
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Interestingly, the analyses revealed a significant interaction between the prosecutor’s motivation for proffering hearsay and the
quality of the hearsay substitute.119 The nature of this interaction,
which is shown in Figure 2, was examined by analyzing the effect of
the prosecutor’s motivation when the evidence was good and that
same effect when it was poor.
The prosecutor’s motivation for proffering hearsay affected jurors’
perceptions of the defendant’s guilt when the hearsay evidence was a
good substitute;120 they perceived the defendant as guiltier when
there was a benign motive behind the hearsay121 than when there
was a suspect motive behind the hearsay.122 The same pattern existed
when the hearsay evidence was a poor substitute123—benign hearsay
led to perceptions of a guiltier defendant than did suspect hearsay—
but those perceptions were more polarized.124
Further, when the prosecutor’s motive for proffering hearsay was
not obvious, jurors perceived the defendant as less guilty than when
the prosecutor’s motive was benign.125 This was true both when the
hearsay evidence was good126 and when it was poor.127 This suggests
that omitting the reason for depriving the factfinder of the “best” evidence may be nearly as harmful to a party’s case as providing the
factfinder a bad reason for doing so.128

119. F(1, 68) = 10.63, p = .002, K2p = .14. See left-hand side of Figure 2.
120. F(1, 34) = 14.88, p < .001, K2p = .30.
121. M = 5.00, SD = 0.97.
122. M = 3.75, SD = 0.97.
123. F(1. 34) = 74.89, p < .001, K2p = .69.
124. M-benign = 5.39, SD-benign = 0.98; M-suspect = 2.67, SD-suspect = 0.91. See righthand side of Figure 2.
125. F(1, 68) = 24.30, p < .001, K2p = .26.
126. F(1, 34) = 4.71, p = .037, K2p = .12; M-benign = 5.00, SD-benign = 0.97; M-unknown
= 4.39, SD-unknown = 0.70.
127. F(1, 34) = 20.50, p < .001, K2p = .39; M-benign = 5.39, SD-benign = 0.98; Munknown = 3.67, SD-unknown = 1.28.
128. See id.
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Figure 2
Likelihood of Defendant’s Guilt as a Function of Motivation and
Substitution Quality
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D. Strength of the Prosecutor’s Case
The third set of analyses examined participants’ judgments of the
strength of the prosecution’s case. As Table 4 illustrates, the results
follow largely the same pattern as participants’ judgments of the
defendant’s guilt.
A 2 (motivation: benign vs. suspect) x 2 (hearsay substitute: good
vs. poor) ANOVA on the strength of the prosecution’s case revealed a
significant main effect of the prosecutor’s motivation,128 such that
jurors perceived the prosecutor’s case as stronger when the prosecutor provided hearsay for a benign reason129 than when the prosecutor
had a suspect reason for providing hearsay evidence.130 The analysis
also revealed a marginally significant effect of hearsay substitute,131
such that jurors perceived the prosecutor’s case as stronger when the
hearsay evidence was a good substitute132 compared to when it was a
poor substitute.133
As illustrated in Figure 3, the analysis also revealed a significant
interaction between the prosecutor’s motive and the quality of the
hearsay evidence on jurors’ perceptions of the prosecutor’s case.134 As

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

F(1, 68) = 60.20, p < .001, K2p = .47.
M = 4.97, SD = 0.97.
M = 3.33, SD = 0.96.
F(1, 68) = 2.09, p = .10, K2p = .03.
M = 4.31, SD = 1.01.
M = 4.00, SD = 1.47.
F(1, 68) = 10.81, p < .001, K2p = .14.
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with the analysis of jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt, this
analysis examined the effect of the prosecutor’s motivation when the
hearsay was good and when it was poor.
When the hearsay evidence was a good substitute for the in-court
testimony, the prosecutor’s motivation for proffering it affected jurors’ perceptions of the strength of the prosecutor’s case.135 The prosecutor’s case was perceived as stronger when his motivation was benign136 compared to when it was suspect.137 A similar pattern of results existed when the hearsay evidence was a poor substitute for the
in-court testimony (although the results were more polarized),138 such
that a benign motive for presenting hearsay evidence139 led jurors to
perceive the prosecutor’s case as stronger than when his motivation
was suspect.140
Figure 3
Strength of Prosecutor’s Case as a Function of Motivation and
Substitution Quality
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In light of these findings, further analyses examined the possibility that the effect of the prosecutor’s motivation for proffering hearsay on jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt may be mediated
by jurors’ perceptions of the strength of the prosecutor’s case. In
other words, the prosecutor’s motivation for proffering hearsay may
affect jurors’ perceptions of the strength of the case against the
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

F(1, 34) = 9.89, p = .003, K2p = .23. See left-hand side of Figure 3.
M = 4.78, SD = 1.06.
M = 3.83, SD = 0.71.
F(1, 34) = 61.70, p < .001, K2p = .65. See right-hand side of Figure 3.
M = 5.17, SD = 0.86.
M = 2.83, SD = 0.92.
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defendant, which in turn may affect jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt. As illustrated in Figure 4, mediation analysis confirmed this hypothesis.141 The prosecutor’s motivation for proffering
hearsay significantly predicted jurors’ perceptions of the prosecutor’s
case,142 and perceptions of the prosecutor’s case, in turn, significantly
predicted jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt.143
Figure 4
Mediation Analysis
Strength of Case
.24*

-.46**

Motivation

-.36** (-.25*)
Perceived Guilt

E. Judgments of the Evidence and Trial Actors
The final set of analyses examined participants’ impressions of the
trial evidence and trial witnesses. Participants’ ratings of the persuasiveness of the hearsay evidence revealed a significant main effect of
motivation144 and an interaction between motivation and substitution
quality.145 When the hearsay evidence presented was a good substitute, it was deemed more persuasive when it was the result of a benign motive146 than when it was the result of a suspicious motive.147
Weaker evidence intensified these effects.148 Mock jurors’ judgments
141. Mediation analysis detects “when a predictor affects a dependent variable indirectly through at least one intervening variable, or mediator.” Kristopher J. Preacher &
Andrew F. Hayes, Asymptotic and Resampling Strategies for Assessing and Comparing
Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models, 40 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 879, 879 (2008).
The mediation analysis reported in this Article is performed using a linear regression
analysis and reports unstandardized coefficients, “B,” and standard errors, “SE.” It also
reports standardized coefficients, “Beta.”
142. B = -.74, SE = .14, standardized Beta = -.46, p < .001.
143. B = .25, SE = .10, standardized Beta = -.24, p = .016. Moreover, the strength of the
direct relationship between the prosecutor’s motive and jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt (B = -.583, SE = .146, standardized Beta = -.36, p < .001) was weakened but still
significant when the strength of the prosecutor’s case was included in the model as a mediator (B = -.403, SE = .161, standardized Beta = -.25, p = .014). Thus, as predicted, the
strength of the prosecutor’s case was a significant partial mediator of the relationship
between the prosecutor’s motivation and jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt (Sobel’s
Z = -2.23, p = .026).
144. F(1, 102) = 28.38, p < .001, K2p = .556.
145. F(1, 102) = 5.12, p = .007, K2p = .10.
146. M = 4.72, SD = 1.02.
147. M = 3.61, SD = 1.09, t(34) = 3.15, p = .003.
148. M-benign/poor = 5.44, SD = 1.04; M-suspicious/poor = 2.83, SD = 0.86, t(34) =
8.21, p < .001.
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of the trustworthiness and strength of the hearsay evidence followed
a similar pattern.
Mock jurors’ assessments of the moral character of the prosecutor
revealed a significant main effect of motivation.149 The prosecutor
was rated as more moral when he had a benign reason for introducing hearsay evidence150 than when he had a suspicious reason for doing so.151 The same pattern holds for jurors’ views of the 911 operator
who provided the hearsay evidence.152
Participants’ impressions of the 911 caller were affected by the
prosecutor’s motivation to proffer hearsay.153 When the prosecutor
had a benign reason for using hearsay, participants viewed the 911
caller as more moral154 than when the prosecutor had a suspicious
motive for calling the 911 operator to the stand155 or when jurors
were not told the prosecutor’s motive.156 They rated the 911 caller
just as moral when the prosecutor put forth hearsay testimony for
suspicious reasons,157 as when the prosecutor did not provide an explanation for calling the 911 operator to the stand.158
V. FOLLOW-UP PILOT EXPERIMENTS
To further strengthen the results obtained in the main experiment
reported in this Article (the “Main Experiment”), I report the results
of five short follow-up studies. The follow-up studies served two purposes: (1) to better generalize the results to real-world settings and
(2) to control for potential confounding factors that might explain the
results reported in the Main Experiment.
These follow-up studies provide evidence that the results reported
in the Main Experiment occur in a more realistic trial scenario and
replicate across legal actors, across different types of cases, and
across different types of hearsay evidence. Further, two potential
confounding factors are eliminated as explanations for the results.
149. F(2, 59) = 5.26, p = .008, K2p = .195.
150. M = 5.50, SD = 1.35.
151. M = 4.00, SD = 0.81, t(34) = 4.04, p < .001. Interestingly, jurors rated the prosecutor as less moral when he provided no reason for proffering hearsay evidence (M = 4.40, SD
= 0.70) compared to a prosecutor who had a benign reason (M = 5.50, SD = 1.35), t(34) =
3.07, p = .004. No significant difference emerged between participants’ morality ratings for
a prosecutor who provided no explanation (M = 4.40, SD = 0.70) and one who had a suspicious motive for proffering the evidence (M = 4.00, SD = 0.81), t(34) = 1.59, p = .122. These
prosecutors were viewed as equally moral, and participants viewed both as less moral than
the prosecutor who had a benign reason for introducing hearsay.
152. F(2, 59) = 3.64, p = .03, K2p = .117.
153. F(2, 59) = 10.56, p < .0001, K2p = .28.
154. M = 5.20, SD = 1.14.
155. M = 3.40, SD = 1.65, t(34) = 3.81, p = .001.
156. M = 4.00, SD = 1.15, t(34) = 3.14, p = .003.
157. M = 3.40, SD = 1.65.
158. M = 4.00, SD = 1.15, t(34) = 1.27, p = .214.
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A. Generalizability
Experimental methods allow for greater control and clearer
statements of cause and effect compared to observational or correlational studies.159 Experimental methods are vulnerable, however, to
critiques that they do not measure phenomena as they occur in real
life.160 Experimenters can respond to these critiques by demonstrating that the phenomenon exists in myriad experimental contexts using varied methods. In the absence of perfect external validity,161
such varied results serve as convergent evidence that the phenomenon demonstrated in the laboratory is robust.
I designed three short experiments to increase the generalizability
of the results reported in the Main Experiment. These studies test
whether jurors scrutinize (1) the motivation behind proffered hearsay
when the motivation is not obvious, (2) the motivation behind the trial strategies of criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs, and (3) the
motivation behind hearsay that courts would deem inadmissible.
1.

Follow-Up Study 1: Imperfect Motivational Information

The Main Experiment informed participants of the prosecutor’s
motivation to proffer hearsay through a “God’s-eye view.” The manipulation was purposefully heavy handed; it was designed to test
whether perfect information regarding a party’s motive for proffering
hearsay would inform jurors’ judgments when they assigned probative weight to the hearsay evidence. The experiment suggests that
jurors do so.
But jurors will rarely have perfect information regarding a party’s
strategy for proffering hearsay evidence. When jurors have imperfect
information regarding a party’s strategy to proffer hearsay evidence,
does that imperfect information affect their judgments of the weight
of the hearsay evidence? I designed this follow-up study to answer
that question in a manner that more closely mirrors the circumstances surrounding a real trial.
(a) Methodology
This experiment employed the robbery vignette used in the Main
Experiment, albeit with several modifications. The motivation of the
prosecutor to proffer hearsay was manipulated, as was the substitution quality of the evidence. Participants filled out questionnaires
159. See Robbennolt, supra note 105, at 483.
160. See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in Trials:
A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
231, 232 (1988). A more detailed discussion and response to this critique is reserved for
Part VI, infra.
161. See discussion infra in Part VI.

32

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

and free-response items that asked questions regarding the prosecutor’s
decision to proffer hearsay, just as they did in the Main Experiment.
The manipulation of the prosecutor’s motive was designed to be
substantially subtler in this version of the experiment. Participants
in the “benign motive” condition read a lengthy cross-examination of
the police officer by the defense attorney, who asked the officer several questions regarding the eyewitness declarant. During the colloquy, the police officer offhandedly mentioned that the eyewitness had
died of an unrelated illness before trial.
Participants in the “suspicious motive” condition also read a
lengthy cross-examination of the police officer by the defense attorney. In questioning the officer regarding her dealings with the eyewitness, the defense attorney elicited from the officer that she had
spoken with the eyewitness as recently as the morning of the trial
and that the witness lived and worked in the area. The defense attorney then asked the officer if she knew whether the eyewitness
planned to testify, which drew an objection from the prosecutor. The
defense attorney then withdrew the question.
Finally, participants in the “blind motive” condition read a crossexamination that did not bear on the prosecutor’s potential motivation for declining to call the declarant.162 All participants then completed the questionnaires.
(b) Results and Discussion
Jurors take a party’s motivation for proffering hearsay into account when evaluating the evidence even when the prosecutor’s motive is less obvious. A two-way ANOVA revealed results remarkably
similar to those reported in the Main Experiment: a main effect of
motivation,163 such that benign hearsay164 led to greater perceptions
of the defendant’s guilt than did suspicious hearsay;165 and a main
effect of substitution quality,166 such that a good hearsay substitute167
led to greater perceptions of the defendant’s guilt than did a poor
hearsay substitute.168
As illustrated in Figure 5, when the hearsay evidence was strong,
jurors deemed the evidence more convincing when the facts suggested that the prosecutor had a benign reason for proffering it compared
162. As in the Main Experiment, this condition was omitted to simplify the remaining
analyses (specifically, to focus on the differences between participants who were exposed to
benign hearsay and those who were exposed to suspicious hearsay).
163. F(1, 68) = 116.50, p < .001, K2p = .63.
164. M = 4.78, SD = 0.99.
165. M = 2.33, SD = 1.04.
166. F(1, 68) = 10.17, p = .002, K2p = .13.
167. M = 3.92, SD = 1.56.
168. M = 3.19, SD = 1.56.
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to a suspicious reason.169 A similar pattern emerged when the hearsay served as a poor substitute for the in-court testimony.170
Figure 5
Likelihood of Defendant’s Guilt as a Function of Motivation and
Substitution Quality
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Thus, this follow-up experiment suggests not only that jurors take
into account a party’s motivation when assigning probative weight to
hearsay, but also that they do so with imperfect information.
2.

Follow-Up Study 2: Criminal Defendants and Civil Plaintiffs

The Main Experiment suggests that jurors examine a prosecutor’s
motivation for proffering hearsay when deciding what probative
weight to assign the evidence. It is not obvious, however, that jurors
will examine the motive of other legal actors, including criminal defense attorneys or civil litigants.
There are reasons to believe that jurors might view a prosecutor’s
motive for putting forth hearsay differently from a defense attorney’s
motive for doing so. Unlike some litigants, prosecutors always bear
the burden of proof and are tasked with additional ethical duties beyond those required of other attorneys.171 These additional ethical
169. M-benign = 5.17, SD-benign = 0.92; M-suspect = 2.67, SD-suspect = 2.67; F(1, 34) =
67.11, p < .001, K2p = .67 (see left-hand side of Figure 3).
170. M-benign = 4.39, SD-benign = 0.92; M-suspect = 2.00, SD-suspect = 1.08; F(1, 34 =
50.95, p < .001, K2p = .60 (see right-hand side of Figure 3).
171. See, e.g., Chris G. McDonough, Diana Brusca McDonough & Raymond G. Keenan,
The Ethical Obligations of the Criminal Prosecutor, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 50 (2001)
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duties may reflect a consensus among the legal profession, and
among the population at large, that prosecutors should be held to
higher standards when presenting their cases, because the liberty or
even the life of the defendant is at stake.172 As a result, jurors might
hold prosecutors to higher standards with respect to the evidence
that prosecutors put forth to prove the defendant guilty of a crime.
Jurors might, therefore, bristle at a prosecutor’s suspicious motive for
proffering hearsay, particularly when the hearsay is the centerpiece
of the prosecutor’s case, whereas they might not react similarly to a
defendant’s (or civil litigant’s) suspicious motive.
Conversely, public opinion polls suggest that Americans are suspicious of trial tactics employed by criminal defense attorneys.173 Jurors
might be even more suspicious of a defense attorney’s strategy to
provide weaker evidence of trial facts. Thus, we might expect the results reported in the Main Experiment to be even more pronounced if
the party providing the hearsay evidence is a defense attorney instead of a prosecutor.
In sum, different hypotheses can be formed as to whether the results reported in the Main Experiment are universal—that is,
whether the results are replicable to other actors in the criminal system and to actors involved in civil causes of action. Two follow-up experiments addressed these hypotheses.
(a) Criminal Defendants: Methodology
The methodology for this follow-up experiment was similar to the
methodology employed in the Main Experiment. Participants read a
robbery trial vignette in which an attorney’s motivation for proffering
hearsay evidence was either “benign,” “suspicious,” or “blind.” Further, the hearsay evidence provided was either a good or a poor substitute for the declarant’s in-court testimony.
This experiment contained two important differences, however.
This time the criminal defense attorney, not the prosecutor, proffered
the hearsay evidence. Also, in addition to rating the defendant’s likelihood of guilt, mock jurors rendered binary “guilty/not guilty” judgments.
In this version of the robbery vignette, the eyewitness apparently
identified to the 911 operator someone other than the defendant. The
defense attorney introduced this evidence at the trial but did not call
the eyewitness to the stand. Instead, the defense attorney proffered
(detailing the myriad additional ethical considerations facing prosecutors, including the
pretrial investigation, arrest, decision to prosecute, charging determination, and arraignment of the defendant).
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MESSAGE
FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY 18 (2001), available at
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1211996548.53/Polling%20results%20report.pdf.
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either the tape of the eyewitness’s 911 call or had the 911 operator
recount her conversation with the eyewitness. Participants read the
vignette and completed questionnaires about the trial.
(b) Results and Discussion
Jurors appear to treat defense attorneys no better—and no
worse—than prosecutors with respect to their decisions to proffer
weaker evidence of trial facts.
With respect to participants’ judgments of the likelihood of the
defendant’s guilt, the results from this follow-up study mirror the
results reported in the Main Experiment. The results revealed a statistically significant main effect of motivation,174 a significant main
effect of substitution quality,175 and a significant interaction between
motivation and substitution value.176 As in the Main Experiment,
participants’ judgments were affected by the prosecutor’s motivation
for proffering hearsay and the quality of the hearsay that was proffered in place of the declarant’s in-court testimony.
The defense attorney’s decision to proffer hearsay evidence also
affected jurors’ verdicts with respect to the defendant’s guilt. A chisquare test of independence revealed a statistically significant difference in the proportion of guilty verdicts rendered as a function of the
defense attorney’s motivation for proffering hearsay.177 As shown in
Figure 6, participants were more likely to convict the defendant of
robbery when the defense attorney’s motive was suspicious compared
to when it was benign (and vice versa).178

174. F(2, 50) = 5.82, p = .01.
175. F(1, 50) = 4.08, p = .03.
176. F(2, 50) = 4.24, p = .04.
177. F2(2, N = 60) = 11.46, p = .003.
178. F2(1, N = 39) = 15.83, p < .001. Jurors were also more likely to convict the defendant when the prosecutor had a suspect motive compared to when the prosecutor’s motive
was unknown, F2(1, N = 41) = 5.27, p = .072 (marginally significant) (post-hoc Marascuilo
comparisons of multiple proportions).
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Figure 6
Criminal Verdicts Rendered
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These results suggest that jurors do not distinguish between prosecutors and defense attorneys in evaluating their motivation for proffering hearsay. Whether an attorney represents the government or
the accused, it appears that a perceived suspicious motive affects jurors’ judgments of the hearsay evidence, their judgments of the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt, and their likelihood to convict the defendant of the crime at issue. The next experiment examines whether
jurors behave similarly in the context of civil disputes.
(c) Civil Plaintiffs: Methodology
The methodology for this follow-up experiment was nearly identical to the methodology employed in the Main Experiment, with slight
modifications. First, instead of a criminal robbery trial, the trial was
framed as a civil wrongful death action in which the convenience
store clerk’s estate sued the defendant. The same evidence that was
provided in the Main Experiment was provided to participants in this
study. The prosecutor’s motive was either benign, suspicious, or unknown, and the plaintiff proffered either a 911 tape of the eyewitness’s
conversation with the 911 operator or produced the 911 operator to
testify as a hearsay witness. Participants completed questionnaires
similar to those completed by participants in the Main Experiment.
(d) Results and Discussion
If jurors’ expectations of the quality of the evidence proffered by
prosecutors are higher than their expectations of the quality of the
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evidence proffered by other attorneys (here, civil plaintiffs’ attorneys), we would expect different results from those obtained in the
Main Experiment.
The results of this follow-up study suggest that jurors do not treat
plaintiffs’ attorneys differently from prosecutors with respect to the
weight they assign hearsay evidence. As in the Main Experiment,
this study revealed a significant main effect of motivation,179 a significant main effect of evidence substitution quality,180 and a significant
interaction of these variables.181 Again, the plaintiff’s motivation affected jurors’ views of the hearsay evidence and ultimately their
views of the likelihood that the defendant caused the death of the
convenience store clerk.
As in the previous follow-up study, the plaintiff’s motivation for
proffering hearsay evidence affected not only jurors’ views of the likelihood that the defendant caused the clerk’s death, but also their ultimate judgments of the defendant’s civil liability.182 As shown in
Figure 7, jurors more frequently found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the clerk’s death when the plaintiff
proffered hearsay evidence for a benign reason than when the plaintiff proffered it for a suspicious reason.183 Conversely, jurors found
the defendant liable less frequently when the plaintiff proffered
hearsay for a suspicious reason compared to plaintiffs who proffered
hearsay for a benign reason.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

F(2, 43) = 6.02, p = .01.
F(1, 43) = 2.91, p = .035.
F(2, 43) = 3.84, p = .02.
F2(2, N = 57) = 8.30, p = .016.
F2(1, N = 37) = 10.83, p = .005 (post-hoc Marascuilo comparison of multiple proportions).
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Figure 7
Civil Verdicts Rendered
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In sum, these follow-up studies suggest that jurors’ evaluation of
hearsay evidence shows no bias toward a particular legal actor—
prosecutor, defense attorney, or plaintiff’s attorney—or toward a legal case—civil or criminal. Jurors pervasively discount hearsay evidence when parties proffer it for unseemly reasons. But is this true
for all types of hearsay? Do jurors analyze hearsay that is deemed
inadmissible the same way, even though policymakers deem inadmissible hearsay less reliable than admissible hearsay? The next follow-up study examines these questions.
3.

Follow-Up Study 3: Inadmissible Hearsay

The weaker evidence at issue in the Main Experiment consisted of
either a 911 tape recording or the direct testimony of the 911 operator, who recalled her conversation with the 911 caller. In both instances, the evidence was admissible hearsay, because both pieces of
evidence fit the excited utterance and present sense impression exceptions to the general bar against hearsay evidence.184 Further, the
hearsay evidence is non-testimonial under the United States Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and is therefore

184. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1), 803(2).
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admissible if the hearsay is more probative than it is prejudicial and
falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay bar.185
Some might argue that admissible hearsay is exactly the wrong
type of evidence to use in examining whether jurors think critically
about hearsay. They argue that, because it is admissible, this type of
hearsay is inherently more reliable than is inadmissible hearsay,186 and
it may not be surprising that jurors think critically when evaluating it.
Jurors, however, generally do not distinguish between admissible
and inadmissible hearsay. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that
jurors generally cannot consciously recognize hearsay at all, and
cannot categorize it.187 Moreover, the view that admissible hearsay is
more reliable than inadmissible hearsay is based on untested folk
wisdom that may not be accurate.
Nonetheless, I devised the following experiment using inadmissible hearsay evidence to determine whether jurors also think critically
about a party’s motivation to proffer inadmissible hearsay. If jurors
evaluate inadmissible hearsay in the same manner in which they
evaluate admissible hearsay, then the generalizability of the results
obtained in the Main Experiment increases.
(a) Methodology
Mock jurors read a vignette in which a knife company sued another knife company for unfair competition in “palming off” a knife made
by the defendant to look like the knife made by the plaintiff.188 The
plaintiff offered into evidence a letter written by a wholesaler. The
letter read, “We did not find this knife in your catalogue, and we are
highly confused because we think it is yours. Is it yours?”189
The plaintiff did not call the author of the letter to the stand to
testify, and participants learned either that the author had died be-

185. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (ruling that only “testimonial”
hearsay statements, where the defendant has not had an opportunity to cross-examine the
out-of-court speaker, violate the Confrontation Clause); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353
(2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004). A fuller discussion of the Confrontation Clause is reserved for Part VI, infra.
186. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“The present rule proceeds
upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the
declarant in person at the trial even though he may be available.”).
187. See Paglia & Schuller, supra note 59, at 514-15 (finding that jurors have “difficulty with the fine-grained distinction required of the limiting instructions,” which instruct
the jury to use hearsay information for one purpose but not another).
188. “Palming off” is a legal term for misrepresenting one’s goods as goods made by
another. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1219, 1233 (9th Ed. 2009).
189. This letter is inadmissible hearsay. The plaintiff is attempting to admit the out-ofcourt statement into evidence for its truth value—that the knife looks identical to the
plaintiff’s knife—and the letter does not fit an exception to the hearsay rule. See FED. R.
EVID. 801(c), 803.
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fore trial, that the plaintiff declined to call the author because of concerns that the author would not be a good witness, or learned nothing
regarding the reason for the author’s absence. Participants then
filled out questionnaires in which they were asked to determine
whether the defendant was liable to the plaintiff.
(b) Results and Discussion
If the results from the Main Experiment are not generalizable to
other types of hearsay evidence, then we would expect different results in this follow-up study. The study, however, supports the hypothesis that this behavioral phenomenon—that jurors bristle at receiving weaker evidence and examine a party’s motivation for providing it—is not limited to excited utterances or present sense impressions. Rather, this phenomenon appears to extend to inadmissible
hearsay as well.
The results from the follow-up study mirror the results from the
Main Experiment. A chi-square analysis reveals that the plaintiff’s
motivation for proffering hearsay affected jurors’ judgments that the
defendant “palmed off” the knife.190 As shown in Figure 8, participants more frequently found the defendant liable for unfair competition when they were exposed to a benign-intentioned plaintiff compared to a suspicious-intentioned plaintiff.191 Conversely, participants
more frequently found the defendant “not liable” when the plaintiff’s
intentions were suspicious.

190. F2(2, N = 69) = 12.55, p = .002.
191. F2(1, N = 46) = 17.25, p < .001 (post-hoc Marascuilo comparison of multiple proportions).
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Figure 8
Civil Verdicts Rendered

Verdict Frequency

25
20

5
11

15
10

17
Not Liable

18

Liable

12

5

6
0
Benign

Unknown

Suspect

Plaintiff Attorney's Motivation

These results suggest that not only do jurors make motivational
inferences with respect to the trial strategy of various legal actors to
proffer admissible hearsay, but also that the same phenomenon appears to exist when evaluating inadmissible hearsay—that is, hearsay that policymakers deem less reliable and that jurors may have
more difficulty evaluating. In sum, jurors appear to critically evaluate hearsay regardless of the legal actor who proffers it. Further, jurors’ critical evaluations are not limited to specifics types of hearsay.
B. Potential Confounds
The follow-up experiments reported in Part A suggest that jurors
critically evaluate a party’s strategy for proffering hearsay evidence,
which affects the probative weight that they assign the evidence.
These experiments, however, do not eliminate the possibility that
confounding factors influenced the results of the Main Experiment. A
confounding factor is a rival explanation for the association between
two variables or phenomena.192 If confounding factors exist, it becomes difficult to make clear statements of experimental cause and

192. For example, “if both a decrease in the speed limit and a new seatbelt law precede
a [decrease] in traffic fatalities, the seatbelt law would” be a confounding factor with respect to an assertion that the decrease in the speed limit caused the drop in fatalities. “[T]o
attribute cause to the [lowered] speed limit, [the seatbelt explanation] must be controlled
in some way.” LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 104, at 31.
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effect. It is therefore important to eliminate confounding factors as
an explanation for the experimental results.
The final follow-up studies address two confounds that may have
affected the results of the Main Experiment: (1) the perceived
credibility of the available hearsay declarant; and (2) the possibility
that the questionnaire format measured participants’ “test taking”
abilities and not their true underlying assessments of how a party’s
trial strategy affects jurors’ perceptions of the probative value of
hearsay evidence.
1.

Follow-Up Study 4: The Declarant’s Credibility

In the Main Experiment, the 911 caller did not testify either because he had died or because the prosecutor worried that the caller
would not be a good witness. The possibility exists that, in discrediting the hearsay stemming from the available declarant, jurors might
have speculated that the hearsay declarant was inherently less credible; for example, jurors might have believed that the declarant had a
prior conviction on his record. I designed the following experiment to
determine whether it is the prosecutor’s decision not to call the witness or the witness’s perceived credibility that jurors are attuned to
when they weigh the probative value of the hearsay evidence.
(a) Methodology
This study was a truncated version of the Main Experiment. Participants read the robbery vignette, but the eyewitness always had a
prior conviction on his record that could damage his credibility. Half
of the participants learned that the prosecutor proffered hearsay because the declarant had died before trial, and half of the participants
learned that the prosecutor proffered hearsay evidence because the
declarant might not make a good witness. Participants then rated the
appropriateness of the prosecutor’s decision to proffer hearsay evidence. They also rated the probative weight of the hearsay and explained the reason for their decision.
(b) Results and Discussion
If the declarant’s perceived credibility explains the results of the
Main Experiment, then we would expect the participants in this follow-up study to rate the appropriateness of the prosecutor’s decision
the same regardless of experimental condition. Here, both declarants—the one who died and the one who was alive but did not testify—had prior convictions that would affect their credibility. If, however, the decision to proffer hearsay instead of the live declarant’s incourt testimony is driving the results of the Main Experiment, we
would expect the participants in this follow-up study to statistically
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differ with respect to their judgments of the appropriateness of the
prosecutor’s decision.
The results support the latter hypothesis. Figure 9 reveals that
participants exposed to hearsay because the declarant died before
trial rated the prosecutor’s decision to proffer hearsay as significantly
more appropriate than did participants exposed to hearsay because
the prosecutor did not want to call the declarant as a witness.193
Moreover, these latter participants frequently cited as their reason
for discounting suspect hearsay that the declarant’s underlying
statement was untrustworthy.194

Appropriateness of Decision

Figure 9
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These results provide evidence that the credibility of the declarant
does not explain the results reported in the Main Experiment. Rather, it appears that the prosecutor’s refusal to call the “best” witness
led jurors to draw negative inferences about the hearsay evidence
independent of the hearsay declarant’s credibility.
2.

Follow-Up Study 5: Savvy Test Takers

As with most vignette studies, it is possible that the Main Experiment measured participants’ test taking abilities instead of the un-

193. M-benign prosecutor = 5.28, SD = 1.15, M-suspicious prosecutor = 3.01, SD = 0.94,
t(32) = 6.00, p < .001. Higher ratings indicate that the decision is deemed appropriate.
194. This explanation was compared against explanations that focused on punishing
the prosecutor for her decision. Explanations that focused on the trustworthiness of the
evidence outnumbered punitive explanations by a 6:1 margin.
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derlying psychological or behavioral phenomenon at issue. Some
might argue that participants were simply penalizing the prosecutor
because the experiment made it obvious that the participants should
do so.
To determine whether savvy test taking explains the results of the
Main Experiment, a less direct method of evaluating how jurors respond to potentially unseemly strategic decisions by legal actors is
necessary. I constructed a follow-up study in which participants (who
thought that the experiment had concluded) chose between ballpoint
pens and bottles of Purell® hand sanitizer after reading a trial vignette in which the prosecutor proffered hearsay.195 If jurors choose
the Purell bottle more frequently when the prosecutor’s motive is
suspicious, this is evidence that the prosecutor’s motivation affects
jurors on a more visceral level.
(a) Methodology
As in the Main Experiment, participants learned of either a benign-intentioned prosecutor or a suspicious-intentioned prosecutor
who proffered hearsay evidence. Instead of rating the appropriateness of the prosecutor’s actions, however, participants completed
reading comprehension questions and “distracter” items, including a
word search and sentence completion tasks.
Upon completing the experiment, I provided the participants a
choice of two items as compensation for their participation: a ballpoint pen or a small bottle of Purell hand sanitizer.196 After choosing
an item, participants were debriefed and dismissed.
(b) Results and Discussion
This follow-up study examined indirectly whether participants in
the Main Experiment were simply savvy test-takers, or whether they
more viscerally objected to the use of hearsay when the best evidence
of a trial fact is available. If participants are simply savvy testtakers, there should be no difference in the proportion of Purell bottles selected and the proportion of ballpoint pens selected by the participants, because the prize selection was (in the participants’ eyes)
not part of the experiment. If, however, a suspicious trial strategy
affects jurors on a more visceral level, that reaction may bleed into
their choice of prize. In essence, participants exposed to a suspiciousintentioned prosecutor should select the Purell bottle more frequently
195. This experimental design was created by Kenworthey Bilz in a study of the exclusionary rule. See Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 149, 163 (2012).
196. Both items have approximately the same retail value and pretest subjects rated
the prizes as equally desirable. See id.
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than the ballpoint pen, while participants exposed to the benignintentioned prosecutor should choose the pen and the Purell bottle in
relatively equal amounts.
The results are displayed in Figure 10 below. A chi-square test of
independence revealed a statistically significant difference in the
proportions of prizes chosen by participants. Specifically, participants
chose the Purell bottle with significantly greater frequency when
they were exposed to a suspicious-intentioned prosecutor than when
they were exposed to the benign-intentioned prosecutor.197 Indeed,
participants exposed to the suspicious-intentioned prosecutor overwhelmingly chose the Purell bottle, whereas participants exposed to
the benign-intentioned prosecutor chose the Purell bottle and the pen
in roughly equal numbers.
Figure 10
Participants’ Prize Choice
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These results strongly suggest that participants in the Main Experiment (and in the subsequent follow-up studies) were not simply
perceptive test takers. Rather, a party’s decision to proffer suboptimal evidence when the party could have provided the best evidence of
a trial fact appears to affect participants in a visceral manner.
VI. IMPLICATIONS, OBJECTIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The Main Experiment posed two related questions. First, are jurors attuned to a party’s motivation to put forth hearsay evidence
instead of a declarant’s in-court testimony? Second, when a satisfac197. F2(1, N = 49) = 5.12, p = .024.
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tory reason for proffering hearsay evidence is not obvious to jurors,
do they draw spontaneous inferences regarding the party’s motivation, and do those inferences affect their legal judgments?
The Main Experiment answers these questions in the affirmative.
Jurors were attuned to the prosecutor’s motivation to put forth hearsay evidence, as reflected in their judgments of the defendant’s guilt.
When a benign motive for the hearsay evidence was made salient,
jurors discounted the hearsay significantly less than they did when a
suspicious motive for the hearsay evidence was made salient. In
short, a suspicious motive for putting forth hearsay evidence will not
go unnoticed by a jury. This appears to be true even when a defendant proffers the evidence, even in the context of civil trials, and even
with respect to different types of hearsay evidence.
Interestingly, when a party puts forth hearsay that is a particularly poor substitute for the declarant’s in-court testimony, the motivation behind that strategic choice became even more salient to mock
jurors. Jurors placed a greater discount on hearsay evidence when it
was poor quality and the product of a suspicious motive than when
the hearsay was high quality and a product of a suspicious motive.
The results from this study also suggest that jurors spontaneously
draw inferences regarding a party’s motivation for introducing hearsay evidence when a reason for doing so is not obvious. Jurors appear
skeptical of the decision to proffer hearsay, and they attribute suspicious motives to a party that fails to explain why she has not offered
stronger evidence.198 Jurors were just as likely to convict a defendant
when the prosecution’s case contained “suspicious” hearsay as when
jurors were not aware of the reason for the hearsay evidence. But
when a benign motive for proffering the hearsay was made salient
to jurors, they weighed the hearsay more heavily and were more
likely to convict the defendant. Altogether, the results from these
studies suggest that jurors consider a party’s strategy for proffering
hearsay evidence an important variable when evaluating the quality
of that evidence.
These effects extended beyond global judgments of the defendant’s
guilt. The prosecutor’s motivation to use hearsay evidence also affected judgments of the prosecution’s case, judgments of the individual witnesses, and perceptions of the strength, persuasiveness,
trustworthiness, and moral force of the evidence presented. Jurors
viewed the prosecutor’s case as less persuasive when he had a sus-

198. The responses of study participants to qualitative free-response questions bolster
this interpretation of the results. A supermajority of participants who were not told the
reason for receiving hearsay evidence expressed concern regarding the declarant’s failure
to testify.
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pect reason for proffering hearsay.199 They found the 911 operator
much less persuasive and trustworthy when the prosecutor had a
suspect motive for calling the 911 operator to testify.200 A suspect
motive for proffering hearsay evidence caused mock jurors to view
the prosecutor as less moral than when the prosecutor had a benign
motive for putting forth hearsay. And jurors perceived the 911
caller as less moral when the prosecutor had a suspect motive for
proffering hearsay.
Follow-up experiments shed additional light on how jurors think
about an attorney’s trial strategy when assigning probative weight to
evidence. Jurors make motivational inferences even when they are
not explicitly told why an attorney has proffered hearsay and instead
must glean the attorney’s motivation from the circumstances under
which the evidence is presented. Moreover, they make these inferences regardless of whether it is a criminal prosecutor, a criminal
defendant, or a civil plaintiff who proffers hearsay evidence, and
these inferences affect their verdicts as well. Jurors also make these
inferences regardless of whether the hearsay is admissible or inadmissible. Confounding factors, including demand effects201 and the
credibility of the hearsay declarant, do not explain these results.
Even assuming that the experimental results reported in this Article reflect mock jurors’ true mental processes when evaluating a
party’s strategy for proffering hearsay evidence, some might argue
that jurors are acting irrationally. They might argue that regardless
of a party’s motivation to proffer hearsay evidence, the underlying
hearsay evidence is the same. Therefore, jurors are focusing on irrelevant factors when assigning weight to hearsay evidence. This argument misses an important point: Because of the additional motivational inferences that jurors can make when a declarant is available
but is not called to testify, the underlying hearsay evidence is not
the same. Realizing that the “best” witness to some trial fact could
have been called—but was not called—allows jurors to come to the

199. Moreover, they viewed the prosecutor’s case as less persuasive when he did not
provide a reason for proffering hearsay, which suggests that jurors suspected that there
were probative weaknesses in the declarant’s testimony that the prosecutor was attempting to obscure.
200. It is not the case that jurors are simply imputing some impure motive onto the 911
operator by association with an overtly suspicious prosecutor. The 911 operator was seen
as less moral even when the prosecutor’s motive remained unarticulated.
201. A demand effect is an effect wherein participants form an interpretation of the
experiment's purpose and unconsciously change their behavior to fit that interpretation.
See, e.g., Martin T. Orne, Demand Characteristics and the Concept of Quasi-Controls, in
ARTIFACTS IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 110, 110 (Robert Rosenthal & Ralph L. Rosnow eds.,
2009) (“Special methodological problems are raised when human subjects are used in psychological experiments, mainly because subjects’ thoughts about an experiment may affect
their behavior in carrying out the experimental task.”).
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reasonable conclusion that there are likely to be probative weaknesses in the declarant’s testimony.202
Nonetheless, some may argue that there are myriad reasons why
a party might fail to call the “best” witness, and so a juror’s default
assumption that the declarant’s testimony must contain probative
weaknesses will not always be accurate. This may be true sometimes.
Nonetheless, it may not be the most useful way in which to evaluate
juror decisionmaking. In a real trial, we never know with absolute
certainty whether or not a defendant has committed a crime. Thus,
defining “accuracy” in this way is not particularly meaningful because we cannot measure the accuracy of factfinders’ verdicts in real
trials.203 What we can measure, however, is whether information that
should be relevant to jurors is, in fact, relevant to them and informs
their judgments. To the extent that relevant information does inform
their judgments, this is evidence of good decisionmaking. The experiments reported in this Article suggest that jurors make use of relevant
information surrounding a party’s decision to proffer hearsay evidence.
Altogether, these findings suggest that a party’s strategic decisions at trial play a crucial role in explaining how jurors evaluate
hearsay. They also have implications for the jury as an institution
and for trial attorneys.
A. Legal Implications
1.

Juror Decisionmaking

The results reported in this Article provide new information regarding how jurors process evidence. Recall that past research suggests that judgments of the persuasiveness of an argument are affected by the perceived motivation of the presenter. For example,
mock jurors were able to disregard potentially prejudicial pretrial
publicity when they had reason to believe that the disseminator of
that publicity was biased against the defendant.204 This social psychological phenomenon extends not only to pretrial publicity, but also to

202. Some might also wonder whether jurors were simply punishing the prosecutor
because he may have been trying to hide evidence from them—a perceived moral failing
that is irrelevant to the probative value of the evidence. The experiments do not support
this explanation. When asked why they were discounting the evidence, participants more
often listed reasons relating to potential weaknesses in the underlying evidence than they
did reasons indicating that they wished to “punish” the prosecutor.
203. It is theoretically possible to construct an experiment that can determine the
magnitude of the weight jurors give to motivational inferences regarding a party’s trial
strategy. An experimenter could attempt to create a Bayesian model of optimal juror decisionmaking with respect to hearsay evidence and compare it against the weight that jurors
actually afford the evidence. Such an experiment has its own challenges, however. For example, it would be difficult to calculate the prior probabilities crucial to a Bayesian analysis.
204. See Dunning, supra note 55, at 481; Fein et al., supra note 68, at 1220.

2012]

OMISSION SUSPICION

49

a more subtle action: the decision to proffer hearsay instead of the
declarant’s in-court testimony.
The results reported in this Article also add to past research on
how jurors perceive legal actors who appear to be “hiding” or omitting
evidence. Prior research suggests that defendants who invoke the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination are judged by jurors as more likely to be guilty than defendants who do not.205 Further, jurors are more likely to convict defendants who appear less
than forthcoming, even if they do not invoke the Fifth Amendment.206
Similarly, it appears that jurors view the strategic choice to proffer
hearsay for a suspect purpose as a way of “hiding” probative weaknesses in the underlying evidence, and jurors weigh the hearsay evidence consistent with this suspicion.
The findings reported in this Article also contribute to researchers’
understanding of juror behavior more generally. Although research
suggests that jurors engage in potentially irrational decisionmaking
at various stages of trial,207 researchers have also found consistently
that the single best predictor of jury verdicts is what we would expect
it to be: the weight of the evidence.208 The studies reported in this Article showcase another area in which jurors appear to make rational
decisions: when evaluating hearsay evidence. Beyond that, this study
suggests that juries consider an attorney’s strategic choices in ways
that the law may not appreciate fully. It is not obvious that policymakers expect juries to evaluate a party’s strategy for proffering
hearsay evidence when weighing the evidence. Yet that is what they
appear to do.
These findings have implications for how jurors process evidence
beyond the context of hearsay. The studies reported in this Article
suggest that jurors prefer direct evidence to circumstantial evidence.
They also suggest that jurors think critically when evaluating “lesser” forms of evidence. Perhaps these findings also suggest that parties should be given greater freedom to present their cases to a jury
in the manner they deem the most effective and persuasive. To the
extent parties proffer weaker evidence in support of trial facts, the
legal system may be best served by trusting the jury to give this
weaker evidence less weight.

205. See Hendrick & Shaffer, supra note 16.
206. See Shaffer et al., supra note 94, 1238-40.
207. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 185; Diamond & Levi, supra note 23,
at 225; Hazelwood & Brigham, supra note 21, at 710-12.
208. See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 150 (2007).
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The Hearsay Doctrine

The data presented in this Article, coupled with past empirical
data on hearsay, suggest that the normative conversation among policymakers over the propriety of the hearsay doctrine should change.
The argument for barring hearsay evidence at trial rests on several
rationales.209 As other scholars have argued, one of the touchstone
arguments for disallowing hearsay evidence at trial is the concern
that jurors are insensitive to factors that might cause hearsay to be
unreliable.210 For example, because the out-of-court declarant usually
is not cross-examined, jurors may fail to appreciate that the declarant may have lied, may have been biased, or may simply have been
mistaken when she made her statement. Similarly, although the
hearsay witness can be cross-examined, jurors may still fail to appreciate fully the possibility that the witness may be lying, biased, or
mistaken about the declarant’s statement.
Prior research suggests, however, that jurors are skeptical of
hearsay evidence and consider shrewdly the effects of cognitive factors such as age and time on the reliability of hearsay statements.211
The experiments reported in this Article suggest that jurors are also
“motivationally intelligent” consumers of hearsay. When jurors cannot discern the strategy behind a party’s choice to proffer hearsay
evidence, they grow skeptical of the evidence and discount it accordingly. Thus, the empirical data with respect to how jurors perceive
hearsay trends largely in one direction: jurors think much more critically about hearsay than the law currently recognizes.212
If the belief that jurors incompetently evaluate hearsay evidence
does not withstand empirical scrutiny, policymakers should consider
peeling away, “like layers on an onion,”213 this empirically untenable
argument and refocus the debate on philosophical and democratic
objections. For example, we might worry that allowing hearsay evidence to be admitted at trial may discredit the judiciary in the eyes of
the public,214 may lead to unfair surprise,215 may lead to inconsistent
verdicts,216 or may delay the finality of verdicts.217

209. See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 36, at 1372-73; Park, supra note 35, at 1057-60.
210. See, e.g., Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26, at 70-72.
211. See Dunlap et al., supra note 53, at 25; Pathak & Thompson, supra note 52, at 372-74.
212. See, e.g., Dunlap et al., supra note 53, at 35-36; Kovera et al., supra note 50, at
714-15; Meine et al., supra note 7, at 699.
213. Thompson & Pathak, supra note 33, at 470.
214. Swift, supra note 34, at 512 n.43.
215. See Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26, at 79-81.
216. See Park, supra note 35, at 1064 (referring to Nesson’s suggestion that the hearsay rules support stable verdicts).
217. Nesson, supra note 36, 1372-75. Interestingly, many of these philosophical and
democratic objections make untested empirical claims about the behavior of litigants, factfinders, and the public.
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It may serve hearsay policymakers well to focus the normative
conversation about hearsay on the value of confrontation, which some
scholars have argued should be the sole rationale for the hearsay
bar.218 The Supreme Court has recently breathed new life into the
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause in a series of cases examining the hearsay doctrine. In a series of decisions over the past decade,
the Court has clarified that, apart from the various rationales underlying the exclusion or admission of hearsay evidence, a defendant has
an absolute constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to crossexamine her accuser if the accuser makes an out-of-court, testimonial
statement against the defendant.219 If the defendant cannot do so,
then the court must exclude the hearsay statement.220 The future of
the hearsay debate may likely turn on these important constitutional
issues. However policymakers choose to refocus the normative debate
over the hearsay doctrine, they should clear out the underbrush.
The view that jurors do not critically evaluate hearsay evidence lacks
empirical support.
3.

Trial Practice

The experimental results reported in this Article should interest
trial practitioners. Within guidelines established by rules, statutes,
and state and federal constitutions, trial attorneys have significant
freedom to present their case by any means possible. Thus, attorneys
are confronted with a menu of strategic choices in advocating for
their clients. There are myriad reasons why a witness may become
unavailable to testify at trial. During the often lengthy period that
precedes a trial on the merits, witnesses may die, become ill, move
away from the jurisdiction, or decide that they do not wish to testify.
218. See Park, supra note 35, at 1057-58 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 26, and explaining that Wigmore believed that “the essence of the Hearsay rule is a requirement that
testimonial assertions shall be subjected to the test of cross-examination”).
219. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353
(2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
220. The Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the scope of a “testimonial” statement
in later cases. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143; Davis, 547 U.S. 813. The Confrontation Clause,
of course, applies only in criminal—not civil—trials, and does not apply to non-testimonial
statements, such as attempts to alert police officers to an ongoing emergency. Bryant, 131
S. Ct. at 1153-55; Giles, 554 U.S. at 357-58; Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. Moreover, the fact that
myriad hearsay exceptions exist at all—including exceptions that appear to be based on
necessity rather than on the inherent reliability of the statement—may be evidence that
confrontation is not the sole basis for the hearsay bar. See FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory
committee’s note (“Rule 803 . . . is based upon the assumption that a hearsay statement
falling within one of its exceptions possesses qualities which justify the conclusion that
whether the declarant is available or unavailable is not a relevant factor in determining
admissibility. The instant [R]ule [804] proceeds upon a different theory: hearsay which
admittedly is not equal in quality to testimony of the declarant on the stand may nevertheless be admitted if the declarant is unavailable and if his statement meets a specified
standard. . . . [H]earsay, if of the specified quality, is preferred over complete loss of the
evidence of the declarant.”).
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The trial attorney is then put in a quandary: if the witness has not
died but is otherwise unavailable, does the attorney expend resources, including money and time, to ensure that the testimony
reaches the jury, or does the attorney use hearsay to ensure that the
evidence reaches the jury, albeit in an indirect way?
This study suggests that trial attorneys should conduct a thorough
cost-benefit analysis when answering that question and that the perceived motivation for proffering a hearsay witness is an important
variable that trial attorneys must consider carefully. Putting forth
hearsay evidence is not a costless endeavor. Jurors are likely to discount hearsay evidence compared to a declarant’s in-court testimony.
When they cannot discern a clear motive for the use of hearsay, or if
they perceive the motive for using hearsay to be suspect, jurors become suspicious of potential probative flaws in the declarant’s out-ofcourt testimony. The results from this study suggest that, if an outof-court declarant’s testimony is critical to her case, an attorney
should spare little expense in procuring the witness if a benign reason for proffering hearsay would not be obvious to the jury.
This study also suggests that judges should allow attorneys to explain to the jury, either in opening or closing statements, their reasons for proffering hearsay. To the extent that allowing an attorney
to do so falls to the discretion of the trial judge, experimental research suggests that motivation matters—whether it is the motivation of the defendant, the expert witness, or the attorney.221 Thus,
trial judges should afford attorneys this freedom to assist the jury in
making an informed judgment about the evidence presented. If an
attorney is not permitted to explain her reasons for proffering hearsay, it would serve her well to make her motivation for proffering
hearsay clear to the fact finder through other means, including the
direct- and cross-examination of witnesses.
Conclusions on the basis of one experimental Article should be
modest. In this study, the available declarant was always in the area
and apparently could have testified if he had been called as a witness. But how would jurors evaluate a strategic decision to proffer
hearsay evidence when the declarant is not in the immediate area
and it would be expensive to procure her testimony? Continued research on the effects of a party’s motivation to proffer hearsay might
produce a model that provides practitioners with best practices for
how to put forth evidence in the most effective manner at trial.
At least one lesson seems abundantly clear: This study suggests
that there is a measurable and significant strategic drawback to presenting hearsay or other weaker evidence, even if that evidence has

221. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
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the imprimatur of the Federal Rules. Simply because a party can
proffer evidence does not mean that she should proffer it.
B. Caveats and Future Research
As with most mock juror experiments, several caveats apply.
First, mock jurors in this study did not deliberate before rendering
their verdicts. Some researchers have found that group deliberation
can affect individual mock juror judgments.222 But Kalven and Zeisel
have found that by far the best predictor of verdicts rendered by deliberating juries is the pre-deliberation judgments of the jury majority.223 In other words, most jurors’ judgments do not change radically
as a result of discussion with other jurors. Nonetheless, researchers
have found consistently that group deliberations can polarize the
judgments of individual group members.224 It follows that the interaction of motivation and substitution quality observed in the Main Experiment might be even greater in a real-world setting in which jurors deliberate before rendering their verdicts. Thus, the effects of
group deliberation on juror judgments of a party’s tactical decision to
use hearsay might be a fruitful area for future research.
Second, as with all vignette studies, there is a concern that the
experimental results may not replicate in real-world trials. The experiments in this Article required participants to read a criminal trial vignette and answer written questions. Ideally, participants would
observe a real trial (or an authentic trial reenactment) and render
judgments that participants believe have real consequences to the
trial participants. Practical concerns, including the potential confounds that may arise from using actors to portray trial participants,
and the ethical problems of placing study participants in a situation
in which they believe they could send a criminal defendant to prison
make such ideal experimental designs impractical. Although researchers have found that results obtained in artificial laboratory
conditions often replicate in real-world situations,225 researchers can
strengthen their laboratory results by using a variety of experimental
designs and methods to create convergent validity for their claims.
The findings reported in this Article are an important first step in
understanding the ways in which jurors consider a party’s motivation
when evaluating hearsay evidence. Researchers should continue to
222. See Thomas R. Carretta & Richard L. Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Effects of
Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291,308 (1983).
223. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 488-89 (1966).
224. See Jerry K. Palmer & James M. Loveland, The Influence of Group Discussion on
Performance Judgments: Rating Accuracy, Contrast Effects, and Halo, 142 J. PSYCHOL.
117, 118-19 (2008).
225. Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal
Decision Making, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 73 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
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identify contextual factors that affect judgments about hearsay. For
example, this experiment examined how jurors responded to two different motivations by the prosecutor for proffering hearsay: necessity
(the “benign” motive) or a desire to shield the declarant from crossexamination (the “suspect” motive). But a party’s motivation for putting forth hearsay likely falls on a continuum between these extremes. Future research might examine how jurors respond to other
types of motivation for proffering hearsay. For example, how would a
jury view the motivation of a party who puts forth a hearsay witness
when the declarant is physically available but legally unavailable
because she invokes an evidentiary privilege? Answers to these questions will clarify the contexts in which a party’s motivation has the
greatest effect on mock jurors’ judgments about hearsay.
Future researchers might also explore the origins for the tendency
of jurors to scrutinize a party’s strategy for proffering hearsay. To the
extent that we believe that jurors think critically about hearsay, do
they also possess an unconscious aversion to lesser evidence? Or is
the hearsay bar itself—of which jurors are presumably aware—
causing jurors to be suspicious of the evidence? Researchers might
answer these questions by comparing American attitudes toward
hearsay with the attitudes of people from countries that have less
stringent hearsay rules.226 They might also compare the attitudes of
participants in administrative hearings—which do not follow the
rules of evidence and place minimal restrictions on hearsay evidence—with the attitudes of trial participants toward hearsay.
The “hoary issue of hearsay”227 provides multiple challenges for
the empirical researcher. The hearsay doctrine is complex, arguably
inconsistent, and consists of numerous, sometimes conflicting, rationales for its existence. But even though empirical examinations of
hearsay are in their infancy, researchers have made great strides in
determining the cognitive and motivational factors to which fact
finders are attuned when presented with this complex evidence. The
study reported in this Article suggests that a party’s motivation for
proffering hearsay is an important factor that jurors consider when
assigning hearsay evidence its probative weight. On a grander scale,
it also suggests that in contexts—such as the hearsay context—where
jurors are confronted with weaker evidence when stronger evidence
is available, we should trust jurors to examine the attendant strategic circumstances that surround the decision to proffer that evidence
226. It would be worthwhile to study whether jurors critically evaluate other types of
evidence that are, under certain circumstances, barred out of a concern that jurors will
incompetently evaluate them. Future researchers might examine how jurors respond to a
litigant’s use of character evidence, a party’s prior bad acts, or a party’s subsequent remedial measures. See generally FED. R. EVID. 404, 407, 609.
227. Dunning, supra note 55, at 482.
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and trust them to weigh the evidence accordingly. More research in
this vein will provide informational benefits to judges, juries, attorneys, the legal academy, and ultimately the legal system and society
in which these actors function.

